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CA CORPORATE MOITORSHIPS IMPROVE CORPORATE COMPLIACE? 
 
Cristie Ford1 and David Hess2 
 
Over the last few years, prosecutors and SEC enforcement attorneys have 
increasingly relied on settlement agreements (such as deferred prosecution agreements) 
to combat securities violations and other corporate criminal acts. Many of these 
agreements require the use of corporate monitors to oversee the corporation’s 
compliance with the settlement and its implementation of a compliance program to 
prevent future violations of the law. Although these agreements have received significant 
attention from legislators and scholars, there has been no investigation into the critically 
important question of whether or not the use of corporate monitors achieves its intended 
goals. Based primarily on interviews with individuals directly involved in monitorships, 
we look at the entire monitorship process—including the selection of the monitor, how 
the monitor conducts his or her work, and what happens after a monitorship—and find 
that decisions at critical points during this process lead to monitorships that are 
significantly less ambitious than government pronouncements behind them and seem 
unlikely to achieve their goals on any consistent basis. After identifying these problems, 
we suggest measures for reform. 
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I. Introduction  
 
The use of corporate monitorships as part of settlement agreements with the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is now a 
common feature of corporate crime enforcement. 3 These agencies have placed monitors 
in such well-known corporations as America Online, Bank of New York, Boeing, 
KPMG, and Monsanto. The monitor’s role is to ensure that the corporation meets the 
terms of its settlement agreement, such as a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), 4 
which typically requires that the corporation end its wrongful practices and develop and 
implement an improved compliance program to prevent future violations.5 
Although some argue that settlement agreements with monitorships are a “stroke 
of genius,” since the government can achieve all it wants out of a conviction (e.g., 
admission of guilt by the company and the implementation of reforms) without the costs 
of a complete investigation and trial,6 critics abound. Some argue that the terms of these 
                                                           
3 For an overview of the use of settlements, see generally Benjamin M. Greenblum, 5ote: What Happens to 
a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1863 (2005); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006); Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement 
Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89 (2006); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 
93 VA. L. REV. 853, 856 (2007). 
4 For the purposes of this article, our reference to DPAs refers to both deferred prosecution agreements and 
non-prosecution agreements.  
5 Orland, supra note 3, at 72. 
6 Interview with Jan Handzlik, Partner, Howrey, Los Angeles, California, CORP.CRIME REP., Sept. 10, 
2007, at 12, 12-13. In SEC settlement agreements, the party typically does not admit guilt. See SEC v. 
Baker Hughes Incorporated and Roy Fearnley, Civil Action No. H-07-1408, Litigation Release No. 20,094 
at ¶ 6 (Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm (stating that 
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settlement agreements are too lenient and corporations should be criminally convicted for 
their actions.7 Others take the opposite view and argue that these agreements are too 
punitive and that monitors have the potential to run amok over corporations.8 Critics also 
claim conflicts of interest have led to the selection of monitors based on personal or 
political connections rather than competency.9 Members of Congress have noted these 
controversies and have taken action, including a hearing by the House Judiciary 
Committee10 and the proposal of two bills to regulate the use of monitors.11 In response, 
the DOJ attempted to stave off legislative interference by issuing new guidelines on the 
use of monitors.12 
 Missing from this debate, however, is research into the critically important 
question of whether or not monitorships actually achieve their intended goals.13 This 
article takes a first step toward addressing that question and focuses on the basic issue of 
whether settlement agreements with corporate monitors actually work to improve 
corporate behavior going forward. That is, can monitorships be justified on the basis of 
improving a corporation’s development and implementation of an effective compliance 
program? Also, if monitorships are falling short of these goals, are there reforms that can 
be implemented to improve their performance? Thus, the goal of this article is to provide 
an initial exploration into how monitorships actually work in practice. To do this, our 
analysis is based in significant part on our interviews with individuals directly involved 
in the monitorship process, including corporate monitors, regulators, and compliance 
consultants.14 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“Without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, Baker Hughes has consented to the entry of 
a final judgment . . .”) 
7 See Crime without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and 5on Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP. 
(5ational Press Club, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 28, 2005, at 3-10, available at 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm. 
8 See O’Hare, supra note 3, at 90.  
9 See infra note 149 and accompanying text (noting the controversy resulting from the selection of former 
US Attorney General John Ashcroft as a corporate monitor). 
10 Hearing on Deferred Prosecution: Should Corporate Settlement Agreements Be without Guidelines? 
Hearings before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, 110th 
Cong. (March 11, 2008), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_031108_2.html).  
11 See infra note 150. 
12 See infra note 153. 
13 Exceptions of academic research focused specifically on corporate monitors include O’Hare, supra note 
3 and Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The 5ew Corporate Czar, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007). O’Hare, however, focuses on only on one example---Richard Breeden’s 
monitorship at WorldCom. Khanna and Dickinson focus primarily on a theoretical analysis of when 
monitorships should be used instead of financial penalties and whether or not monitors should have duties 
to the corporation.   Other research has focused on the issue of whether the government is abusing its power 
in reaching settlement agreements (e.g., by requiring corporations to waive attorney-client privilege). See 
Earl J. Silbert and Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of 
Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225 (2006). 
14 See infra Part IV. 
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This article proceeds by first providing a brief description of monitorships as 
currently used. This part also provides a discussion of the use of similar monitor-type 
arrangements in other settings that have influenced the current use of monitorships. Part 
III then shows the evolution of corporate compliance programs over time, which have 
gone from a focus on technical compliance with specific issues to broader programs that 
are integrated into the corporation’s culture and business operations. This is an important 
discussion, since monitorships are intended to ensure that corporations have implemented 
an effective compliance program. Part IV provides an analysis of monitorships in 
practice. Based on interviews with those involved in monitorships and on secondary data, 
we investigate the entire monitorship process including the scope of the monitor’s duties 
under the agreement, the selection of the individual to serve as monitor, how the monitor 
conducts his work in practice, and finally what occurs after the monitorship ends. In 
general, we find that the cumulative result of decisions made with respect to each of those 
issues during the process leads to monitorships that are significantly less ambitious than 
government pronouncements behind them, and are at risk of not achieving their goals on 
any consistent basis. Part V then provides recommendations for reforms to help ensure 
that monitorships are crafted to meet the challenges at hand in any specific case and to 
create a process to allow them to improve over time based on experience. 
II. The Past and Present of Monitorships 
A. Current Use of Monitorships 
The use of corporate monitorships as currently structured is relatively new. The 
DOJ has imposed at least 44 monitorships as part of settlement agreements with 
corporations, almost all of which date from 2003 or later,15 which is the post-Enron, post-
Sarbanes Oxley Act era. The SEC has often participated with the DOJ in its 
monitorships,16 along with using them on their own.17 As discussed further below, the 
SEC has a longer history with monitorships that has evolved over time. Although 
different terminology is used to describe the monitorship18 and there is variation in the 
details of the monitor’s duties, they all have the same basic structure, which is that the 
corporation is to retain at its own expense a monitor to oversee its compliance with the 
                                                           
15 Our count of the number of DOJ monitorships comes from the DOJ’s letter to the House Committee on 
the Judiciary. The letter listed 41 monitorships, with all but three of those occurring in 2003 or later. Letter 
to John Conyers Jr., Chairman of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, from Brian A. Benczowski, Principal 
Deputy Assistant General, May 15, 2008, at 5 (copy on file with authors). The DOJ noted in the letter that 
this may not be a complete list. Id. at 2. Since the letter, and as of the time this article was originally 
drafted, the DOJ has entered three additional monitorships. See infra note 168 and accompanying text 
(discussing the cases of AGA Medical, Faro Technologies, and Willbros). 
16 See Schnizter Steel Industries, Deferred Prosecution Agreement (2006), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/Schnitzer061016.pdf; Schnitzer Steel 
Industries, SEC Admin. Proceeding, (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-
54606.pdf. 
17 See Delta and Pine Land Company, SEC Admin. Proceeding, (2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56138.pdf 
18 In some cases the monitor is referred to as an “independent consultant” or “independent examiner,” for 
example. 
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settlement agreement and its implementation of required reforms, such as an improved 
compliance program.19 Over a period usually between 18 and 36 months, the monitor will 
continue to review the corporation’s implementation of the reforms and report back to the 
relevant government agents on the corporation’s progress.  
In the Parts that follow we will provide more detail on the use of monitorships in 
theory and in practice. This Part, however, provides a brief history of monitorships and 
how they have evolved over time in their use in corporations and other organizations. 
This history helps provide a lens through which to view the current use of monitorships. 
B. Forerunners to Corporate Monitorships 
1. Mobs, Prisons, and Private Inspector Generals 
Corporate monitorships have a direct history in public law litigation and in labor 
union corruption cases brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO).20 Public law litigation refers to lawsuits filed against such 
public institutions as schools, prisons, police and fire departments, and mental health 
facilities, where the plaintiffs seek court involvement in restructuring the organizations 
involved and ongoing monitoring of the implementation process.21 To monitor a consent 
decree, the court appoints an independent third party to oversee the defendant’s 
implementation efforts. The third party—such as a referee, monitor, or special master—
could be assigned different powers ranging from simply reporting back to the court on the 
defendant’s performance to making adjudicative decisions.22 In certain cases, such as 
with prisons, the court-appointed trustees had experience in other prison trusteeships and 
were possibly working multiple trusteeships at the same time.23  
In addition to these public institutions, monitors were imposed in DOJ lawsuits 
against labor unions under RICO that were resolved with consent decrees. These 
monitors served as trustees that were charged with attempting to reform unions that were 
under the control of organized crime. The trusteeships varied considerably in terms of 
how they operated and the powers granted to the trustees. In some cases, the trustees had 
powers equivalent to the union’s officers, including the power to negotiate contracts and 
initiate strikes.24 In other cases, the trustee did not even have the power to remove corrupt 
                                                           
19 See infra Part IV.A.3 
20 Garrett, supra note 3, at 857, 869-74. 
21 For a general review, see generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1022-53 (2004); see also Susan P. Sturm, A 
5ormative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991). 
22 Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Re-form Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 725, 732-35, 746-49 (1986) (distinguishing between the powers of a monitor and special master). 
23 JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS 246 (2006). 
24 James B. Jacobs et al., The RICO Trusteeship after Twenty Years: A Progress Report, 19 LAB. LAW. 419, 
427-28 (2004). 
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union members.25 The duration of the trusteeship could be indefinite or for a fixed term 
as short as 18 months.26  
The trustees—who were almost always ex-prosecutors27—had to develop their 
reform strategies on their own, since the trustees did not issue public reports and there 
was very little, if any, contact between trustees.28 Thus, they were largely unable to learn 
from the successes and failures of others.29 Overall, some of these cases were successful, 
but others were not.30 They were influential, however, as many of the monitors we 
interviewed believed that idea for monitorships came from union trusteeships. 
The Independent Private Sector Inspectors General (IPSIG) model is similar. 
These monitors got their start in New York in the 1990s helping New York City ensure 
that companies contracting with the city were not engaging in fraud, overbilling, or other 
violations of law.31 The individuals were placed in contractors to oversee their billing 
practices, completion of work claimed to be performed, and other practices. One offshoot 
has been IAIPSIG, the International Association of Independent Private Sector Inspectors 
General, which seeks to promote the use, integrity and professionalism of Independent 
Inspector Generals.32 
2. Corporations and Monitors 
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC has used court-ordered 
receiverships as part of its civil enforcement suits since at least the 1960s.33 The 
receiverships initially served a traditional asset preservation role, ensuring that the assets 
of the corporation were not subject to misappropriation or waste by management.34 Over 
time, SEC receiverships evolved to serve the goal of ensuring the corporation would 
comply with securities laws in the future.35 Although receiverships were used for solvent, 
ongoing corporations, as opposed to receiverships in bankruptcy, the receiver was an 
officer of the court with duties to the receivership estate, which made it difficult for the 
                                                           
25 Id. at 428, n.49. 
26 Id. at 426-27. 
27 Id. at 424-25. 
28 Id. at 433-34. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 452; see also Jacobs, supra note 23, at 242-45 (providing a list of the trusteeships and a review of 
whether or not each was successful). 
31 James B. Jacobs & Ron Goldstock, Monitors & IPSIGS: Emergence of a 5ew Criminal Justice Role, 
CRIM. L. BULL., (2007), at 217.  
32 The Web site of the International Association of Independent Private Sector Inspectors General, 
available at http://www.iaipsig.org. 
33 James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779, 1787 
(1976). 
34 Id. at 1787. 
35 Id. at 1787-88. Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 
1200-01 (1975) [hereinafter Equitable Remedies]. 
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receiver to carry on a business in an entrepreneurial fashion.36 In addition, the presence of 
a receiver often gave the company a poor reputation among its various stakeholders.37 
Both factors harmed the ongoing business of the company. 
In cases where a receivership was viewed as unnecessary but there were willful 
violations of securities laws, SEC settlement decrees included the appointment of 
independent directors (with or without a change in management),38 a “special counsel,” 
or an “advisor.”39 The appointment of independent directors was a way to have the 
benefits of a receivership, but limit the drawbacks associated with excessive negative 
publicity and receivers’ obligations to act as officers of the court.40 Special counsel were 
typically attorneys and they were given broad investigative and other powers.41 It was not 
uncommon for special counsel to be used simultaneously with court-appointed 
directors.42 The special counsel typically conducted an investigation and filed a report 
with the SEC and the court,43 but in some cases they had the power to bring suits on 
behalf of the shareholders based on their investigations.44  Advisors, on the other hand, 
had no power to act independently of the board and were often experts who only 
provided advice in specific areas (e.g., auditing). Corporations agreed to “special 
counsels” or advisors because it was a more attractive option than the alternative of a 
receivership.45 Associated with these agreements could be the requirement to adopt 
certain practices and internal controls designed to prevent the future recurrence of the 
securities violation at hand.46  
This approach was popular with the SEC prior to 1984, when the agency had very 
limited authority to impose civil penalties. Thus, the SEC relied on “remedial 
undertakings such as procedural reforms and independent monitors, to enforce 
compliance with the securities laws.”47 Although the SEC continued to use this approach 
                                                           
36 Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1201-2. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 1205. The court-appointed directors typically could not be voted out by the shareholders during a 
specified time period and would only be liable to the shareholders for gross negligence. Id. at 1206. 
39 Farrand, supra note 33, at 1793-94. 
40 Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1206. 
41 Farrand, supra note 33, at 1794. 
42 Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1208. 
43 Arthur F. Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunctive Actions, 
31 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1329-30 (1975-76). 
44 Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1208-9. 
45 Farrand, supra note 33, at 1794-95; Mathews, supra note 43, at 1326 (1975-76). In other situations, the 
SEC would ask the court to appoint an independent director. Id. at 1326-28. 
46 Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1196-99. 
47 Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm., Address at 
the 24th Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate & Securities Law Institute (April 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042904smc.htm. 
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to some degree,48 after 1984 monitorships received less attention until they enjoyed 
renewed popularity in the post-Enron era, in parallel with their adoption by the DOJ.49 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General. Starting 
in the 1990s, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General 
began using Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) as way to resolve claims related to 
False Claims Act investigations (e.g., over-billing the government’s Medicare program). 
What began as a loose copy of other self-disclosure programs (e.g., the Defense Industry 
Initiative)50 is now a formalized process with corporations agreeing to over 500 CIAs in 
the last few years.51 A CIA requires the corporation to implement improved internal 
controls and a compliance program, appoint a compliance officer, conduct employee 
training, and potentially fulfill other requirements as well.52 In addition, CIAs typically 
require an Independent Review Organization (IRO) to evaluate the compliance program. 
Companies compete for the IRO business. For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers claims 
to have served as an IRO for more than 50 companies.53  
Department of Justice (DOJ). In addition to DPAs, corporate monitorships have 
been used as a term in a court-ordered probation after a criminal conviction or guilty plea. 
Although the idea of probation for organizations had existed for some time, the 1991 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were the first governmental approval of probation 
for rehabilitation purposes (previously, probation was limited to ensuring corporations 
pay fines or restitution).54 Under the guidelines, courts were required to order probation if 
                                                           
48 For examples of cases where the SEC required an independent consultant to review a company’s 
compliance policies and procedures, see, e.g., In the Matter of Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation, 
Admin. Proceedings File No. 3-9535, 1998 SEC LEXIS 137 (Jan. 29, 1998); In the Matter of Smith Barney 
Inc., Admin. Proceedings File No. 3-9426, 1997 SEC LEXIS 1973 (Sept. 23, 1997). In addition to the SEC, 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA) and its predecessor organizations—the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)—began making 
more frequent use of monitorships starting in the early 1990s. Examples include settlements involving 
Nikko Securities (1993 N.Y.S.E. WL 389168) and Nomura Securities (1995 N.Y.S.E. WL 705399).  
49 See Cristie L. Ford, Toward a 5ew Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN L. REV. 757, 797 
(2005). 
50 See infra notes 78 to 81 and accompanying text (describing the Defense Industry Initiative). 
51 See Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Corporate Integrity 
Agreements, available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.html. For a list of Corporate Integrity 
Agreements and links to the texts of the agreements, see http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/index.html. 
52 Id. 
53 PwC Advisory Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Industry Group, How Can Pharmaceutical and Life 
Sciences Companies Effectively Meet the Challenges of 5egotiating and Implementing a Corporate 
Integrity Agreement (2008), available online at 
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/industry.nsf/docid/D600B97CB2E4727780257221003B784A/$file/corporate
_integrity.pdf.   
54 William S. Lofquist, Organizational Probation and the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 525 ANNALS OF 
THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 161 (1993); see also William S. Lofquist, Legislating 
Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control, 27 LAW. & 
SOC’Y. REV. 741, 749 (1993) (noting that the legislative history behind the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
(which provided for corporate probation) indicated that Congress rejected probation terms that were 
invasive and only approved noninvasive terms (e.g., fine collection and community service)). 
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the organization had more than 50 employees and did not have a compliance program in 
place.55 As part of a probation order, courts were allowed to require corporations to report 
on the implementation of the program, and to have a special probation officer monitor 
compliance based on a records review or employee interviews.56 After the 2004 
amendments, the guidelines state that even if a corporation has a compliance program, a 
court “shall” order a term of probation “if such sentence is necessary to ensure that 
changes are made within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal 
conduct . . . .”57  
Commentators’ early criticisms and endorsements of corporate probation mirror 
the current debate about corporate monitorships. Critics questioned the ability of judges 
to effectively implement and monitor the requirements in a probation order.58 With 
respect to an early draft of the original sentencing guidelines, one commentator suggested 
that Senate confirmation hearings on federal judges must now assess those judges’ 
abilities to run major corporations, since that was what the guidelines would now 
require.59 Gruner, for example, argued instead for a probation system under which a 
corporation proposed a compliance program to the court, which upon approval became 
part of the probation terms, to be monitored by some form of probation officer.60 Gruner 
argued that this approach had several advantages, including shifting the burden to 
corporations, the ability to tailor the program to the corporation’s specific needs, greater 
legitimacy of the program within the corporation because it was internally developed and 
not externally imposed, encouraging innovation in compliance programs due to 
involvement of corporation personnel, and general buy-in by executives.61 Gruner’s 
arguments can easily be used to support the current use of corporate monitorships. 
One example of a probation order that employed a monitor involved Consolidated 
Edison (“Con Ed”). In 1994, Con Ed pled guilty to environmental law violations related 
to the failure to disclose a potential asbestos leak to the public, and the judge sentenced 
the company to the maximum fine and three years’ probation with a corporate monitor.62 
                                                           
55 Lofquist, Organizational Probation, supra note 54, at 162; Christopher A. Wray, Note: Corporate 
Probation under the 5ew Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2028 (1992). 
56 Lofquist, Organizational Probation, supra note 54, at 162. 
57 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1(a) (6). In addition, the company may be required to 
develop an effective compliance and ethics program (§ 8D1.4(c)). The commentary states: “To assess the 
efficacy of a compliance and ethics program submitted by the organization, the court may employ 
appropriate experts who shall be afforded access to all material possessed by the organization that is 
necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the proposed program.” If the organization repeatedly 
violates the terms of probation, the sentencing guidelines specifically grant the court power to appoint a 
special master or trustee to ensure compliance with the court orders (§ 8F1.1 (application note 1)). 
58 Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate Offenders through 
Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 73-74 (1988). 
59 Wray, supra note 55, at 2018. 
60 Gruner, supra note 58, at 83-84. 
61 Id. 
62 Michael B. Gerrard & Deborah Goldberg, Corporate Probation: The Con Edison Sentence, N.Y. L.J. 
(May 26, 1995), at 3. Con Ed pled guilty to violating the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act by 
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In sentencing the corporation, the judge specifically stated that Con Ed had a culture that 
discouraged reporting bad news, and that culture intimidated people who otherwise 
would have reported the presence of asbestos from making such a report.63 The monitor 
was charged with ensuring that Con Ed was adopting and implementing an effective 
compliance program.64 An initial report by the monitor stated that several months into the 
monitorship, Con Ed continued to use intimidation to prevent employees from reporting 
violations.65 The monitor also stated that even if the corporation sincerely attempted to 
implement its new proposed control system, it would have no effect unless the 
corporation also worked to reform its “insular” and “destructive” corporate culture.66 At 
the end of the three-year probation, however, the Judge stated that Con Ed had made 
significant improvements in implementing a compliance program and the company 
credited the change to the guidance of the monitor.67 The monitor, however, had 
expressed some reservations just a few months before the probation ended, stating in a 
report that “[m]anagers a rung or two below the officer level have expressed a fear of 
speaking up. Many employees said their fears will intensify once the probation ends.”68 
He turned out to be correct since, just a few months after the monitorship ended, the 
company again failed to notify the public in a timely manner of potential harm due to 
toxic chemicals,69 and was later placed under the supervision of another monitor.70 
III. History & Evolution of Corporate Ethics and Compliance Programs 
This brief historical overview suggests that ultimately, monitorships are attempts 
to ensure that the organization has policies and procedures in place that will help prevent 
future misconduct. For corporations, those policies and procedures make up the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
failing to notify the public of the release of asbestos in a steam pipe explosion. Id. The Sentencing 
Guidelines’ did not apply to this case because the incidents occurred in 1989, which was before the 
effective date of the 1991 Sentencing Guidelines. 
63 Id. The judge stated “One of the things I found disturbing here was the sense that there were people at 
Con Edison, who testified at the trial, who clearly knew and who should have been jumping up and down 
saying, there is asbestos here, we know it. It was obvious they didn't say it because they were intimidated 
from saying it, because they didn't think that was the corporate culture. . .I do think there was a sense here, 
at certain levels within this company, that you had better not tell the bad news.” 
64 Id.  
65 Don van Natta Jr., Con Ed Cited in Intimidation of Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at B1. 
66 Id. 
67 David W. Dunlap, Memories of the '89 Blast Linger in Gramercy Park, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at B4. 
68 Russell Mokhiber, Reddy Kilowatt: On Probation, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Oct. 1997, at 7, 8. 
69 David M. Herszenhorn, Con Edison Taken to Task Over PCBs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1998, at 45 (noting 
the company delayed for over a week in notifying the fire department of possible exposure to toxic 
chemicals at a fire in one of its buildings); Kevin Flynn, Con Ed to Pay $2 Million to Rescuers Exposed to 
PCBs at Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1999, at B2 (stating the company agreed to pay approximately $2 
million to firefighters and emergency workers exposed to toxic chemicals at the company’s plant and that 
due to the company’s delay in reporting the presence of the chemicals, more people came into exposure to 
them). 
70 Metro 5ews Briefs: Con Edison Accepts U.S. Safety Monitor, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2000, at B8. 
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organization’s ethics and compliance programs. The formalization of compliance 
programs and the development of compliance professionals evolved over a period of 
several decades, and today’s programs are characterized by an integrated and multi-
factorial approach to corporate compliance. This evolution is important because, as 
discussed in Parts IV and V below, corporate monitorships often seem to be operating on 
an older view of compliance—one that is focused on technical compliance as opposed to 
a more holistic, organizational culture-based approach.  
A. A Brief History of Compliance Programs: From Controls to Corporate 
Culture 
An early influence in the development and adoption of compliance programs were 
the antitrust criminal prosecutions in the heavy electrical equipment industry in the 
1960s.71 During one prosecution, General Electric attempted to use its compliance 
program as a defense against the criminal charges.72 Although General Electric was 
unsuccessful, that attempt spurred widespread adoption of antitrust compliance programs. 
Eventually, regulators indicated they would take adoption of such programs into account 
when attempting to determine if a violation was “inadvertent” as opposed to intentional.73  
A second major catalyst for the development and adoption of compliance 
programs was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA).74 In addition to 
prohibiting corporations from making corrupt payments to government officials,75 the 
FCPA requires corporations to implement accounting practices and internal controls that 
are designed to ensure that the company is not making corrupt payments.76 This spurred 
widespread adoption of codes of conduct and compliance programs by multinational 
corporations.77 
Third, in the 1980s,78 due to concerns about corruption in the defense industry, 
and based on the recommendations of a commission appointed by the President, the 
Defense Industry Initiative (DII) was created.79 The DII was an attempt at self-regulation 
that encouraged defense contractors to adopt a code of ethics, provide training on the 
                                                           
71 Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second 
Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1578 (1990). 
72 Id. at 1580-81. 
73 Id. at 1581-82. 
74 Id. at 1582. 
75 Marika Maris & Erika Singer, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 578, 582-90 
(2006).  
76 Id. at 579-81. 
77 Pitt and Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at 1585-86. 
78 Also in the 1980s, Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 
which required broker-dealers and investment advisors to adopt policies and procedures to prevent the 
misuse of material, non-public information. Pitt and Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at 1590-91. 
79 Nancy B. Kurland, The Defense Industry Initiative: Ethics, Self-Regulation, and Accountability, 12 J. 
BUS. ETHICS. 137-145 (1993); see also Defense Industry Initiative Web site, available at 
http://www.dii.org.  
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code to all employees, and to create a “free and open atmosphere” within the organization 
for employees to report instances of fraud.80 Participation in the DII was voluntary, but 
the Department of Defense encouraged participation by indicating that it would consider 
a corporation’s compliance program as a mitigating factor in any debarment decisions.81 
To receive preferential treatment, corporations were expected to self-disclose the 
violation and cooperate with the Department of Defense in its investigation.82  
Finally, the most important influence occurred in 1991 when the United States 
Sentencing Commission followed the lead of the DII and amended the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines to provide a mitigated sentence for corporations convicted of a 
crime if they were able to demonstrate that they had attempted to prevent the misconduct 
by having an “effective” compliance program in place.83 The Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines established seven basic requirements for an effective program, including the 
adoption of standards and procedures to prevent criminal conduct, appropriate oversight 
of the program by high-level personnel, communication of the requirements to all 
employees, and monitoring and updating the program as needed.84 
The Guidelines pushed compliance programs out of the defense industry, beyond 
limited issues such as antitrust and the FCPA, and into the mainstream.85 This spurred the 
significantly increased use of Ethics and Compliance Officers, industry associations to 
support the work of compliance professionals, and education programs put on by such 
groups as the Practicing Law Institute.86 The adoption of compliance programs consistent 
with the Guidelines continued to grow when in 1996, in the case of In re Caremark, the 
Delaware Supreme Court indicated that directors’ fiduciary duties may require the board 
to take advantage of the potential for a mitigated sentence under the Guidelines by 
adopting a compliance program.87 Further incentives to adopt and improve compliance 
programs came in 1999, when the DOJ officially stated that it would take into account the 
adequacy of a corporation’s compliance program when deciding whether to prosecute a 
corporation, as opposed to just prosecuting any individuals involved in the criminal 
                                                           
80 Kurland, supra note 74, at 138. 
81 Pitt and Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at 1595. 
82 Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur. Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The 
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1115-16 (2006). 
83 Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting 
Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 702-3 (2002). 
84 Id. at 703-704. 
85 See David Hess et al., The 2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit 
Call for a Symbiotic Integration of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 733 (2006). 
86 U.S. Sentencing Comm., Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines 29-30 (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/advgrprpt.htm.  
87 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ct. Chan. 1996). The holding in 
Caremark was supported by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). For 
a discussion of Stone’s impact on Caremark, see Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 730-33 (2007) (stating “Stone makes clear that when a board fails to implement 
compliance and monitoring systems or fails to respond to red flags, it fails to act as a faithful and loyal 
monitor”). 
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activity.88 Likewise, in 2001, the SEC issued what is commonly known as the Seaboard 
Report, which indicated that it would be more lenient in its enforcement response for 
corporations that had effective compliance programs in place and cooperated with the 
SEC in its investigation.89 
During this time, academics and industry professionals worked at developing a 
better understanding of what makes a compliance program effective. One of the most 
influential insights was Harvard Business School Professor Lynn Sharp Paine's 
distinction between compliance-based programs and integrity-based programs.90 Both 
applied to compliance programs, but Paine referred to a compliance-based approach as 
focusing primarily on deterrence through punishment for rule violations, while an 
integrity-based program focused on developing appropriate organizational values and 
empowering employees to act upon those values.91 Empirical studies show that the most 
                                                           
88 Murphy, supra note 83, at 712. This policy was found in the Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., 
Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Federal 
Prosecution of Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder Memo]. The Holder 
Memo was updated by Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 
20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter the Thompson 
Memo] and then by Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter 
McNulty Memo]. Most recently, and occurring after the original drafting of this article, the McNulty Memo 
was revised and committed to the United States Attorney’s Manual. Department of Justice, Press Release, 
Justice Department Revises Charging Guidelines for Prosecuting Corporate Fraud, August 28, 2008, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/August/08-odag-757.html. The major revisions relate 
mostly to changes in the consideration of waiver of attorney-client privilege, but also provide that “that 
prosecutors may not consider whether a corporation has sanctioned or retained culpable employees in 
evaluating whether to assign cooperation credit to the corporation.” Id. For purposes of this paper, we retain 
our original language of referring to these charging guidelines as the McNulty Memo, as the DOJ 
monitorships we discuss in this paper almost all occurred under the Thompson or McNulty Memos. 
89 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Divisions, Exchange 
Act Release No. 44969 76, SEC Docket 220 (October 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm; see also Barry W. Rashkover, Reforming 
Corporations through Prosecution: Perspectives from an SEC Enforcement Lawyer, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
535, 539-40 (2004) (discussing the Seaboard Report from the perspective of SEC enforcement). Other 
government agencies also promote the use of compliance programs. For example, the Department of Health 
and Human Services provides guidance on the requirements of a compliance program in the healthcare 
industry. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Compliance Guidance, 
available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.html (providing a variety of documents on 
compliance guidance for different types of healthcare organizations). Most recently, as of December 2007, 
companies that have contracts with the federal government that are over $5 million in value and have a 
duration of over 120 days are required to have a code of ethics and a compliance program. Federal 
Acquisition Regulation; FAR Case 2006-007, Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 65,873 (Nov. 23, 2007). 
90 Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 110-11 (1994). 
91 Id. For an overview and a discussion of empirical studies showing the greater effectiveness of integrity-
based approaches, see David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1791-94 (2007) (stating that “whereas a 
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effective compliance programs have elements of each approach, but that the integrity-
based aspects must dominate.92 
Implementing an integrity-based program requires understanding the 
organization’s culture.93 The importance of managing an organization’s culture to ensure 
the effectiveness of a compliance program gained significant traction when the 
Sentencing Commission formalized it as part of the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines in 2004. The amended Guidelines refer to a corporation’s “compliance and 
ethics program” and describe an effective program as one designed to “prevent and detect 
criminal conduct” and to “promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical 
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”94  
B. The Development of Compliance Professionals 
The increased importance of compliance programs is leading to the development 
of compliance professionals. This development is supported by several nonprofit 
organizations and networks devoted to compliance professionals.95 The Society of 
Corporate Compliance and Ethics has recently started offering a one-day exam (and 
associated training programs) that allow an individual to become a certified compliance 
and ethics professional.96 Some universities are also starting to offer certificate programs 
in compliance.97 
Despite the development of a compliance profession, there remains wide variation 
in corporations’ general approach to their compliance programs. For example, there is no 
uniformity when it comes to whom the organization selects to be in charge of the 
compliance program. A recent survey found that the person with responsibility for the 
compliance program had the word “compliance” in their title (e.g., Chief Compliance 
Officer) in only forty percent of the companies that responded. 98 Others executives in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
compliance-based program focuses on teaching employees the laws and rules they must comply with, an 
integrity-based program focuses on integrating ethics into employees' decision making and inspiring them 
to live up to the company's ethical ideals.”). 
92 Hess, supra note 91, at 1792-94. 
93 Id. at 1792; Paine, supra note 90, at 112. 
94 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2004). 
95 These include the Ethics and Compliance Officers Association (www.theecoa.org), the Ethics Resource 
Center (www.ethics.org), the Open Compliance and Ethics Group (www.oceg.org), the Society of 
Corporate Compliance and Ethics (www.corporatecompliance.org), and the Health Care Compliance 
Association ((http://www.hcca-info.org).  
96 See Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics, supra note 95. 
97 These programs include: George Washington University’s Graduate Certificate in Healthcare Corporate 
Compliance (available at http://nearyou.gwu.edu/hcc/), Florida Gulf Coast University’s Compliance 
Specialist Graduate Certificate (available at http://cps.fgcu.edu/JS/CS/index.html), Hamline University 
School of Law’s Health Care Compliance Certification Program (available at 
http://law.hamline.edu/health/corporate_compliance_certificate_program.html). 
98 Melissa Klein Aguilar, CW Survey Shows Lack of CCO Standards, COMPLIANCE WEEK 1, 18-19 (June 
2008). Larger companies are more likely to have a Chief Compliance Officer. This survey was an online 
survey of the readership of Compliance Week conducted during March 2008 with 284 usable respondents. 
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charge of the compliance program include someone in the General Counsel’s office, the 
controller, or a vice president of internal audit.99 Accordingly, the background of the 
person in charge of the compliance program can also vary. A 2000 survey found that only 
twenty-nine percent of compliance officers in the United States had a law degree.100 This 
reflects the evolution of the role, which seems to be moving away from being viewed as a 
field for simply “legal technicians.”101 The approach to managing a compliance program 
can vary significantly between CECOs who are lawyers by training and CECOs who 
come from a management background. For example, one survey found that legally 
trained CECOs believed that the most important root causes of misconduct were 
employee ignorance of legal requirements and corporate policies.102 Those from a 
management background, however, listed the most important causes as factors related to 
a corporation’s culture, such as lack of leadership on ethics and management pressure to 
meet goals and performance expectations.103 
The individuals  in charge of compliance programs typically report directly to the 
CEO or general counsel, but a smaller percentage report to the Chief Financial Officer or 
the audit committee of the board of directors.104 Even though the individual in charge of 
the compliance program does not report directly to the board, under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, they should have access to the board if needed,105 and it appears that most 
do.106 Some, however, argue that this is not sufficient and that the board should have 
direct control over the compliance officer (e.g., hiring, compensating, terminating).107 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The respondents were from corporations of a wide range of sizes and industries. The raw data is on file 
with the authors. 
99 Id. 
100 James Weber & Dana Fortun, Ethics and Compliance Officer Profile: Survey, Comparison and 
Recommendations, 110 BUS. & SOC. REV. 97, 99 & 105 (2005). 
101 Caron Carlson, The Evolution of the Modern CCO, COMPLIANCE WEEK, March 2008, at 1, 40 (quoting 
the comments of Scott Mitchell, the CEO of a nonprofit organization for compliance professionals). 
102 Gary E. Edwards & Robert Reid, Challenges Facing Corporate Ethics and Compliance Programs: A 
Research Report from Ethos International, at 10-11 (Sept. 2007), available at 
http://www.ethosinternational.net/files/689_file_PDF_EthosResearchReport2007.pdf. 
103 Id. 
104 Aguilar, supra note 98, at 19. The Compliance Week Survey found that 35% report to the CEO, 21% to 
the general counsel, and 13% to the board (or more likely, the audit committee of the board). Id. A 2007 
survey by the Ethics and Compliance Officers Association found that 32% report to the CEO, 41% to the 
general counsel and 7% to the board. Id. at 18. A third study, conducted by the Conference Board in 2005 
with 225 respondents, found similar results, with 31% of executives in charge of compliance reporting to 
the CEO, and 37% to the general counsel. Ronald E. Berenbeim, Conference Board Research Report: 
Universal Conduct: An Ethics and Compliance Benchmarking survey, at 10-11 (2006).  
105 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2) (2004). 
106 Berenbeim, supra note 104, at 11-12 (finding that for publicly traded US corporations only 5% of 
executives in charge of compliance had no contact with the board, and that 46% communicate with the 
board in some manner on a quarterly basis). 
107 See W. Michael Hoffman & Mark Rowe, The Ethics Officer as Agent of the Board: Leveraging Ethical 
Governance Capability in the Post-Enron Corporation, 112 BUS. & SOC. REV. 553 (2007); W. Michael 
Hoffman et al., An Investigation of Ethics Officer Independence, 78 J. BUS. ETHICS 87 (2008); see also 
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These commentators argue that this is necessary because ethics and compliance officers 
“do not have sufficient power, status [or] authority”108 to do their jobs appropriately, 
which is further harmed by an inherent conflict of interest resulting from the compliance 
officer being accountable only to top management.109 For example, one former chief 
compliance officer stated, “[a]s a chief compliance officer, the stances you have to take 
are sometimes in opposition to the direction the company may otherwise be inclined to 
go. That requires lots of intestinal fortitude.”110 Others in the field claim that compliance 
officers have been forced out of their jobs when they refused orders from top 
management to stop an investigation, for example.111 Complaints that compliance officers 
face pressures to not start an investigation or to close it before completion appear to be 
fairly common.112 
C. Summary of Monitorships and Compliance Programs 
Over the last few decades there has been tremendous growth in the importance of 
corporate compliance and ethics programs in criminal and civil liability. Although 
compliance programs started out focused on specific issues, best practices now suggest 
that a single program should encompass the near entirety of a firm’s efforts at compliance 
with laws and regulations.113 This development has not been without controversy, 
however. Critics argue that corporations use compliance programs as “window dressing” 
to create merely the appearance of a commitment to compliance, which may still provide 
the corporation the benefits of a mitigated sentence if the need arises.114 These are “paper 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Scott A Roney et al., Leading Corporate Integrity: Defining the Role of the Chief Ethics and Compliance 
Officer (CECO) at 20-21 (2007), available at: http://www.ethics.org/ceco (stating that it is appropriate to 
have the CECO report to either the Board of Directors or the CEO, but that the Board should have authority 
over hiring and firing decisions).  
108 Hoffman and Rowe, supra note 107, at 560. 
109 Id. at 556-57. 
110 Carlson, supra note 101, at 1, 40. 
111 Id. at 41. 
112 In a published interview, a well-known compliance consultant stated, “Unfortunately and sadly, I’m 
aware of a number of cases where compliance officers seek to become the diligent, independent 
professionals they are supposed to be to protect the company from misconduct, and are told by senior 
management to cool it.” Swenson interview with Corporate CORP. CRIME REP. (2006), at 13. This anecdotal 
evidence is starting to be supported by evidence from surveys. One survey of compliance and ethics 
officers—with 127 respondents—found that thirty-three percent of Compliance and Ethics Officers had 
received pressure from corporate officers to not investigate alleged misconduct, and over half (51%) had 
received such pressure from other managers. Edwards and Reid, supra note 102. One in ten CECOs 
reported that they received such pressure from other managers frequently. Id. These compliance ethics 
officers also felt that their quality of investigations into wrongdoing suffered due to a general pressure to 
achieve the objective of closing cases quickly. Id. at 7-8.  
113 See OPEN COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS GROUP, FOUNDATION GUIDELINES: RED BOOK (2008);  
114 See generally, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 5egotiated Governance, 
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of 
Compliance, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999); William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and 
the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 648-49, 657-63 (2002). 
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programs,” where corporations adopt policies and procedures on paper but do not embed 
them into their actual operations.115 In response, and in recognition of the value of an 
integrity-based approach,116 current thinking now expects compliance programs to 
consider an organization’s culture as well, and enforcement agents look for evidence of a 
“compliance attitude” in corporations.117 
During the same time period, monitorships appeared in a variety of corporate and 
non-corporate settings. The overarching goal of a monitorship is to ensure that the 
organization in question has been “reformed,” so that it would exhibit better legal 
compliance in the future. Thus, whether the monitor takes significant control over the 
organization or simply audits the changes management made, the goal is to improve the 
compliance program (using the term broadly) of the organization. However, as fully 
described in the next Part, monitorships in practice do not seem to be keeping up with the 
evolution of the compliance profession. This is in large part explained by the background 
of the monitor selected. Perhaps drawing from the experience of trustees in the union 
RICO suits, monitors are primarily former prosecutors and attorneys with similar 
training, who may not have the right skills and approach for the task at hand.118 
Exacerbating the problem are additional factors, which were also behind the inconsistent 
success rate of trustees in union RICO suits,119 such as lack of information sharing 
between monitors and the failure of the government to conduct systematic performance 
evaluations for the purpose of improving future monitorships.120 The SEC, which started 
on a different monitorship trajectory, now appears to be developing practices consistent 
with the DOJ, and in fact often conducts joint monitorships with the DOJ. The next Part 
explains the path down which the DOJ and SEC monitorships now seem to be going. 
Following this path was not necessarily a conscious choice, but a result of various 
decisions along the way that create a significant gap between the potential of 
monitorships in theory and monitorships in practice. 
IV. Understanding Corporate Monitorships 
Breaking monitorships down into a process involving a series of discrete decision 
stages helps us to think about how they function in practice. The first stage in the process 
is negotiating the terms of the monitorship, which also includes the decision by the 
government to agree to a settlement. During this process, the parties determine whether 
or not a monitor is required and, if so, the duties and powers of the monitor. Second, the 
parties select the monitor through the process defined in the agreement. Third, the 
monitor begins his work, including developing a work plan, analyzing the needs of the 
organization, overseeing the implementation of a compliance program, and evaluating the 
                                                           
115 Interview with Win Swenson, Partner, Compliance Systems Legal Group, Warwick, Rhode Island, CORP. 
CRIME REP. (April 26, 2004), at 10, 16. 
116 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (describing an integrity-based approach).  
117 Rashkover, supra note 89, at 539. 
118 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
119 JACOBS, supra note 23, at 246-47. 
120 See infra Part IV.D. 
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effectiveness of that program. Finally, the monitorship comes to an end with a 
determination by the monitor and the government that the company has satisfactorily 
completed the terms of the agreement. 
 Decisions by the parties at each stage in this process have a significant impact on 
the subsequent stages and ultimately determine whether or not the monitorship is 
successful in terms of improving corporate compliance and preventing future violations 
of law. In order to better see these relationships, this Part presents our analysis of the 
interview data through the stages of this process. This analysis is based principally on 
interviews with individuals directly involved in the monitorship process. To collect our 
primary data, we conducted 20 telephone interviews in the summer of 2008. Almost half 
of our interviews were with individuals who have served as corporate monitors for the 
DOJ and/or the SEC. The rest of the interviews were with monitors in some of the non-
corporate contexts described above, compliance consultants, and regulators in both the 
United States and Canada. We spoke with interviewees not only about their direct 
experience, but also their broader views on monitorships, and those broader views are 
also reflected here. Our secondary data includes public statements made by monitors, 
compliance officers at companies that underwent a monitorship, public officials, and 
attorneys involved in the negotiation of settlement agreements.121 Our analysis also 
includes a review of the settlement agreements and the few cases in which monitorship 
reports were made publicly available.122 
Our study is limited by the fact that we were only able to speak to a subset of 
monitors and regulators, and not to any corporate officials directly involved in a 
monitorship. 123 Although these monitors and regulators described a range of different 
experiences in many ways, our findings could still be unrepresentative if those choosing 
to participate in our study had significantly different experiences from those that chose 
not to participate.  We have also put aside some important differences between the civil 
and criminal contexts in order to keep the scope of this paper focused on monitorships as 
a whole. While this limits the specificity of our findings, it allows us to focus on 
significant and otherwise underappreciated commonalities between these models. Even 
with these limitations, however, we believe our insights and points of caution are 
instructive for the use of corporate monitorships in all situations. These findings point to 
potential problems that should be monitored by any government agency that uses 
monitorships, and should be further investigated and tested by future researchers. 
                                                           
121 These public statements include articles these individuals have written, their public presentations at 
conferences and in “webinars,” and interviews with them conducted by others that were published. 
122 As discussed below, monitor reports are typically not made public. Multiple Freedom of Information 
Act requests, to the U.S. SEC in 2006 and 2008, to obtain copies of monitorship reports and other relevant 
documents were declined, generally on the basis that disclosure would interfere with ongoing enforcement 
activities. 
123 Our sample was selected by contacting all individuals who have served as monitors of whom we were 
aware, as well as corporations involved in monitorships, representatives of nonprofit organizations 
dedicated to corporate compliance, and representatives of several US and Canadian civil and criminal 
regulators. In addition, although we were able to interview a number of regulators, officials from certain 
key government bodies were unwilling to contribute to our study. Our observations about the policies and 
motivations of these specific organizations had to be drawn from publicly available policy documents and 
interviews with external individuals. 
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A. "egotiating the Terms of the Settlement Agreement 
The settlement agreement establishes the terms of the monitorship. The monitors 
we interviewed all placed great importance on conducting their monitorships within the 
bounds of the agreement. Thus, clearly defining the goals of the monitorship and 
establishing the duties of the monitor are highly important for ensuring that the 
monitorship is successful and that success can ultimately be determined by some 
objective standard. Although flexibility in the implementation of monitorships is one of 
their virtues as a policy tool, there is a difference between flexibility—which can be 
carefully designed—and vagueness, which is a failure to specify key components or 
terms. If the terms of the monitorship are too vague, different monitors may interpret 
similar terms quite differently based on their background and approach to monitorships. 
In this section, we first look at the foundational issue of why the government might enter 
into settlement agreements. The policy goals behind that decision should be reflected in 
the stated goals of the monitorship agreement. In this section we also discuss the factors 
that go into decisions about the duties and independence of the monitor. 
1. Settle or Prosecute? Policy Debates Behind Settlement Agreements 
In the criminal context, the first decision a prosecutor must make is whether to 
indict the corporation, agree to a settlement (with or without a monitor), or prosecute only 
individuals and not seek punishment for the corporation. Of course, there will be times 
when imposing sanctions on genuinely “bad apple” individuals is all that is needed. The 
SEC’s Framework for Cooperation and the McNulty Memo factors also suggest that there 
may be times when a corporation’s cooperation is so complete that no enforcement action 
needs to be taken, even where a violation existed. The recent increase in the use of 
settlement agreements has not been without controversy, and also has reinvigorated the 
familiar debate about whether a corporation should be held criminally liable for the 
actions of its employees in any circumstance.124  
This paper’s specific concern is whether, assuming that some action against a 
corporation is called for, settlement agreements with monitorships provide sufficient 
benefits to justify their use.  As stated earlier, some view these settlement agreements as a 
“stroke of genius,” as the “government is able to get everything out of a deferred 
prosecution agreement that it can get out of an actual trial.”125 The government can save 
the costs of an investigation and trial by having the corporation admit wrongdoing (for 
DOJ settlements, but usually not for SEC settlements). In addition, the corporation agrees 
to terms that are equivalent to corporate probation.126 While some celebrate this trend, 
some of our interviewees worried about the “sword of Damocles” that hangs over the 
corporation’s head in the criminal context, even when the company enters into a DPA. 
                                                           
124 For those using the rise of settlement agreements to argue against broad corporate criminal liability 
standards, see, e.g., John S. Baker Jr., Reforming Corporations through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 310, 337 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 28, 2006, at A14; Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle And Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking 
Prosecutorial Pressure On Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2007). 
125 Interview with Jan Handzlik, supra note 6, at 12-13. 
126 Id. 
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On the other side of the debate, some argue that these settlements are letting corporations 
escape accountability127 and perhaps even encouraging corporations to engage in riskier 
behavior and push the limits of the law.128 
Not all cases are appropriate for settlement agreements with monitorships.129 One 
civil-side regulator interviewee told us that only a small portion of the enforcement cases 
it pursues every year result in monitorships. Trying to determine the cases that are 
appropriate is the challenge faced by prosecutors and other government regulators. On 
the criminal side, the McNulty Memo provides guidance on the factors prosecutors 
should consider when conducting an investigation and deciding whether to charge a 
corporation.130 With respect to non-prosecution agreements, the Memo only specifically 
mentions the factor of voluntary cooperation.131 However, the factors related to the 
prosecution decision clearly impact the settlement decision as well. On that front, the 
Memo identifies key factors such as “the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing” and the 
“corporation's history of similar conduct.”132 The Memo does not tell the prosecutor how 
to weigh those different factors against each other, though it does state that in some cases 
one factor, such as the nature and seriousness of the offense, may “warrant prosecution 
regardless of the other factors.”133 
For some of the regulators we interviewed, the presence of these factors related to 
widespread wrongdoing within the organization were what made a case appropriate for a 
monitorship. For example, one regulator stated that monitorships were most appropriate 
where:  
[An organization] has engaged in violative conduct. That violative 
conduct has not been corrected, or we don’t have enough assurance that 
it’s been corrected, so the conduct or the problem might be ongoing. . . . 
The source of the problem is at the firm level, it’s not just an isolated bad 
apple. 
Thus, although many monitorships involve cases of intentional wrongdoing for 
which individuals, including senior corporate officers, are often sanctioned, it is 
important to recognize that individual wrongdoing is often difficult to separate from 
organizational wrongdoing. Likewise, it is difficult to conceive of many situations that 
call for a monitorship, but for no individual responsibility. At some point, however, the 
                                                           
127 Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and 5on Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP., 
Dec. 28, 2005, at 3-10, available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm (referring 
to DPAs as resulting in “crime without conviction”).  
128 Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shift, Corporate Deals Replace Trials, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 2008, at 1. 
129 In this section, we consider settlement agreements with and without monitorships together. Below, we 
consider the issue of whether or not a monitor is needed as part of a settlement agreement. 
130 McNulty Memo, supra note 88, at 4 (stating that the factors listed in the memo should be used by 
prosecutors when “conducting an investigation, determining whether to bring charges, and negotiating plea 
agreements”).  
131 McNulty Memo, supra note 88, at 7-8. 
132 Id. at 4. 
133 Id. at 5. (In addition, the Memo cautions that the nine factors it lists are “not a complete or exhaustive 
list.”) 
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organization must be deemed too rotten to be entitled to a DPA monitorship and must 
face prosecution. As one regulator interviewee suggested: 
If we came to the conclusion that they were rotten to the core, you 
need to indict. That’s still the correct result for the worst of the worst. 
Monitors for those middle cases persuade prosecutors that there have 
been lapses but that they are committed to rectifying these wrongs, 
including terminating responsible people and instituting new control 
mechanisms. 
These comments are basically consistent with our prior arguments that “worst 
actor” (but not utterly corrupt) corporations are those whose conduct was most 
appropriate for a monitorship.134 For those who would argue that corporations with 
widespread wrongdoing cannot be reformed and therefore indictment is necessary, some 
of the union trusteeships may suggest that even deeply corrupt organizations can be 
reformed through monitorships (bearing in mind that the scope of the successful union 
trusteeships seems to be beyond the intended scope of most current corporate 
monitorships).135 The challenge facing prosecutors is identifying appropriate cases for 
monitorships. The prosecutor must be able to distinguish between truly egregious conduct 
that calls for prosecution; those “middle cases” where the conduct was sufficiently 
wrongful and pervasive to justify the costs and intrusions of a monitor; and the lesser 
cases where such costs are not justified.  
Another factor from the McNulty Memo that may outweigh the others and tip the 
scales in favor of a settlement relates to “collateral consequences,” or harm to the 
stakeholders of the corporation.136 The fall of Arthur Andersen is regularly cited as a 
spectacularly bad outcome that demonstrates the need for settlement agreements to 
protect innocent employees and shareholders and to keep viable business entities 
functioning.137 Siemens is a corporation that could potentially benefit from this 
reasoning.138 Siemens, a German company that is also listed on the New York Stock 
                                                           
134 Cristie L. Ford, supra note 49, at 764 (defining “worst actors” as firms/corporations facing serious 
allegations of intentional wrongdoing, where the degree of harm is significant; firms/corporations that are 
potentially recidivists and for whom there is reason to believe that pervasive cultural or ethical problems 
persist, but not firms/corporations that are utterly criminal enterprises); David Hess & Cristie Ford, 
Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A 5ew Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L. 
L.J. 307, 333-335 (providing examples of companies that may classify as worst actors) (2008); see also 
Christopher Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 Yale L.J. 1, 
28 (1980) (describing “that group of firms, impossible to identify in advance, whose behavior in the face of 
realistically achievable penalty levels will remain inadequately modified”). 
135 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
136 McNulty Memo, supra note 88, at 4. 
137 Lichtblau, supra note 128. 
138 Since the original drafting of this article, Siemens reached a plea agreement with the DOJ in which it 
admitted  to violating the FCPA and agreed to pay the largest fines recorded for FCPA violations. Eric 
Lichtblau and Carter Dougherty, Bribery Case Will Siemens $1.6 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec., 16, 2008, at 
B8. Under the agreement, Siemens was allowed to continue to bid for US government contracts, id., and 
accepted a monitor for a period of four years. Department of Justice, Press Release, Siemens AG and Three 
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in 
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Exchange,139 appears to have engaged in egregious violations of the FCPA; and such 
corrupt payments seem to have been deeply ingrained into that organization’s business 
practices.140 One compliance consultant we interviewed suggested that Siemens would be 
the “perfect case” for a monitorship on the basis that, even though this was clearly an 
organization that needed significant help in reforming itself, an indictment that forced it 
out of business would have a tremendous and negative impact. In spite of the importance 
of this factor, however, it is clear that concerns about collateral consequences are not the 
only rationale behind monitorships.141 Indeed, monitorships are regularly imposed on 
midsize corporations and firms, and there is precedent for imposing a monitorship on 
small, family owned businesses as well.142 The government’s reasons for imposing a 
monitorship on a small firm – including one with a tight relationship between ownership 
and control – could be many: the cost of litigation and the possibility that litigation might 
fail, the hope that more concentrated oversight and education could help the firm become 
compliant, or simply the desire not to destroy the firm if other options are still 
available.143 
If any overarching generalization is possible about what cases are appropriate for 
settlement agreements involving monitorships, it would be that some sort of balancing 
test is called for. The misconduct in question should have a systemic, organization-wide 
component, but the misconduct cannot be so pervasive that the corporation or firm is an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Combined Criminal Fines, Dec. 15, 2008, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-
crm-1105.html 
139 William J. Holstein, A Few Bad Apples, and Everybody’s Sauce, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at s. 3, p.10.  
140 Carter Dougherty, Ex-Manager Tells of Bribery at Siemens, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2008, at C4 (reporting 
the testimony of a former manager describing the “intricate system of slush funds and bribery” at the 
company and noting that internal investigators have identified over $2 billion in suspicious payments). 
141 In fact, in announcing the settlement agreement with Siemens, the DOJ did not mention collateral 
consequences as a reason for not seeking an indictment that would bar the company from bidding for 
government contracts, but only Siemens’ extensive cooperation in bringing to light the FCPA violations 
and efforts to reform itself. Department of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Siemens AG 
and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations, Dec. 15, 2008, available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-opa-1112.html. 
142 See, e.g., Union Securities Ltd., 2006 BCSECCOM 220, available at 
http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/comdoc.nsf/65de6f2d8e4d9b50872568ac0070c25c/4190e073ef51088388257154006
7da1e/$FILE/2006%20BCSECCOM%20220.pdf. 
143 For these organizations, the line between individual and corporation starts to blur. Several monitors we 
spoke with believed that a monitorship would not be successful in that situation, because the individual 
wrongdoers could not be extricated from their positions without effectively destroying the firm as well, and 
reform was not possible with the wrongdoers still in leadership positions. In contrast, we posit that these 
small firms may be especially good forums for monitorships. In another context, Darren Sinclair and Neil 
Gunningham have pointed out that many small and medium-sized enterprises operate at the margins of 
profitability and cannot afford to devote many resources to such issues as compliance. Also, they often lack 
expertise and awareness, and in the absence of an acute enforcement event they may not integrate 
compliance priorities into their business processes. NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS & 
LAGGARDS: NEXT-GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 13-40 (2002). These may in fact be exactly 
the right candidates for some form of monitorship (perhaps modified to accommodate their humbler 
resources), because these may be the firms that can benefit the most from some assistance and education at 
a crucial moment. 
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utterly criminal organization. Problems should be serious enough to justify the cost of a 
monitorship, but the corporation or firm cannot be irredeemable. The subject firm or 
corporation can be “too big to fail,” or small enough to learn and reform itself, or 
somewhere in between. Because monitorships can be a viable option in such a range of 
situations, they can become a convenient middle-of-the-road choice (or non-choice) for a 
prosecutor. In fact, one monitor we interviewed thought that monitorships were becoming 
a “fall back position” for prosecutors. That is, monitorships are being imposed on 
corporations without clear thought by the prosecutor as to whether or not they are 
appropriate for the case at hand. The perception that monitorships are being used in a 
“one size fits all” manner may adversely affect their perceived legitimacy and therefore 
their chances of long-term success. 
2. Power and Participation in the 5egotiation Process 
Once the government has decided to enter a settlement agreement, the parties 
must negotiate the exact terms of the agreement.144 Many have noted that prosecutors 
have significant power over corporations in this context. The government has a 
bargaining advantage because it has the option of pursuing criminal charges, and a 
criminal conviction can have a significant negative effect on a company (some even refer 
to it as a “death sentence”).145 In addition, if an executive has already pled guilty, then the 
corporation knows it has little to no defense.146 Some argue that prosecutors have abused 
this power. Professor Epstein goes so far as to argue that “DPAs no longer serve the 
public interest. The agreements often read like the confessions of a Stalinist purge trial, as 
battered corporations recant their past sins and submit to punishments wildly in excess of 
any underlying offense.”147 Complaints receiving significant media attention include 
settlement terms not directly related to the underlying offense148 and conflicts of interest 
within the DOJ relating to the monitor selection process.149 In response, there have been 
calls for greater legislative and court control over monitorships.150 
                                                           
144 In general, there is room to negotiate the terms of the settlement agreement. However, at least one 
regulator we interviewed periodically imposes monitorship terms, using a boilerplate agreement, for 
smaller matters in lieu of conducting a formal investigation. The regulator also uses monitorships, the terms 
of which can be negotiated, in settlement of formal investigations.  
145 Lynnley Browning, Justice Department Is Reviewing Corporate Prosecution Guidelines, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 13, 2006, at 3. 
146 Interview with David Pitofsky, Partner, Goodwin Proctor LLP, 5ew York, 5ew York, CORP. CRIME 
REP., Nov. 28, 2005. 
147 Epstein, supra note 124, at A14. 
148 For example, included within the Bristol-Myers Squibb agreement was the requirement that the 
company endow a chair in ethics at the Seton Hall Law School. Joan McPhee, Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements: Ray of Hope or Guilty Plea by Another 5ame?, 30 THE CHAMPION 12, 14 (2006) (providing 
additional examples as well). 
149 Lichtblau, supra note 128, at 1 (describing the controversy surrounding a US attorney’s selection of 
former Attorney General John Ashcroft to serve as a monitor in case that could earn Ashcroft’s law firm 
over $50 million). 
150 There have been two bills proposed in the 110th Congress to regulate deferred prosecution agreements 
and corporate monitors: The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008, H.R. 6492, 110th Cong. 
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This public criticism has created some changes that attempt to restrict US 
Attorneys’ discretion. In May 2008, the DOJ issued guidelines that prohibit a settlement 
agreement from requiring a corporation to make payments to any organization that was 
not a victim of the criminal activity.151 In March 2008, the DOJ issued guidelines for the 
selection of monitors.152 To reduce the potential for conflicts of interest in the selection of 
the monitor, the guidelines require the use of committees to make selection decisions, and 
require final approval by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.153 
Although public criticism has affected some aspects of monitorship negotiations, 
what has not changed are the parties at the negotiating table. Noticeably absent are any 
parties other than the government and the corporation, including investors, employees, or 
community representatives.154 Khanna and Dickinson observe that corporate 
monitorships share features with proposals by others that would require corporations to 
include on their boards professional, independent directors elected by institutional 
investors.155 This suggests that the shareholders of the corporation may have an interest in 
having a say in the terms of the agreement or the selection of the monitor.156 One 
corporate defense attorney and former prosecutor stated, “I think part of the frustration of 
people who question the government’s use of deferred prosecution agreements is that the 
process does not include parties that may take a contrary view.”157 Also frustrating to 
these other parties is the fact that an unknown number of deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements are not made public. This prevents these stakeholders from having a more 
complete understanding of how the DOJ is handling corporate crime. 
Only one of our interviewees told us that the prosecutors negotiating the terms of 
the monitorship had considered involving a major shareholder in the process. The 
decision was ultimately made not to involve that shareholder, apparently out of concerns 
that the shareholder was more interested in finding fault than reforming the corporation. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(2008) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h6492; and H.R. 5086, 110th Cong. 
(2008), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c110:1:./temp/~c110fksIK0::.  
151 Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum for Holders of the United 
States Attorney’s Manual (May 18, 2008) (copy on file with authors); United States Attorney’s Manual, § 
9-16.325 Plea Agreements, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Non-Prosecution Agreements and 
"Extraordinary Restitution," available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/16mcrm.htm#9-16.320.  
152 Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum for Heads of 
Department Components United States Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
and 5on-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (March 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [hereinafter Morford Memo]. 
153 Id. at 3. 
154 Interview with David Pitofsky, supra note 146. 
155 Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The 5ew Corporate Czar, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1741 (2007). 
156 See id. at 1742 (stating that, “Perhaps institutional investors could have some greater, explicit voice in 
this process by, for example, being consulted by the government agency before appointing a monitor”). 
157 Interview with David Pitofsky, supra note 146. 
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The concern mirrors a parallel concern discussed further below158 about making 
monitors’ final reports to the US Attorney available to the public. In both situations, the 
advantages of opening the process to a wider group of stakeholders may be outweighed 
by the potential chilling effect on the corporation’s complete participation in the 
negotiations and the monitorship process.  
Overall, there is considerable inequality of bargaining power at the negotiating 
table. Not only do corporations not have a better alternative to settlement that would give 
them a credible threat of leaving the negotiation table, but corporations may even be 
afraid to push back against government demands for fear of being perceived as not 
genuinely contrite or willing to correct their problems. While many corporations surely 
enter into monitorships with a sincere desire to fix problems and regain their ethical 
footing, their immediate goal is to mitigate: to resolve the matter without a criminal 
indictment and at the least possible cost.  
3. Corporate Rehabilitation & the Duties of Corporate Monitors 
By contrast to the corporation’s immediate goal, the government’s priorities may 
be wide-ranging, and can include providing appropriate restitution where necessary, 
administering a level of deterrence that is deemed appropriate in the circumstances, and 
putting the corporation on the path to reform. The 2006 McNulty Memo states that the 
decision of whether to prosecute a company or settle should ensure that the goals of 
criminal law—including punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation—are sufficiently 
satisfied.159 The 2008 Morford Memo states that monitorships should not be used “to 
further punitive goals.”160 Taken together, this means that monitorships can serve as a 
reform measure and as a deterrent. As discussed earlier, several commentators challenge 
the idea that monitorships are effective specific or general deterrents. One compliance 
consultant we interviewed, however, suggested that monitorships could be a truly “scary 
deterrent” because, although shareholders may not be too concerned with fines, the 
presence of a monitor can create a troubling level of uncertainty that lasts throughout the 
monitorship. Many of our interviewees also observed that “nobody wants a monitor,” 
effectively because of the disruption they represent to business operations.  
In this paper, our primary concern is with the potential for corporate rehabilitation 
under a monitorship. The desire to spur meaningful reform is implicated at every stage of 
the settlement process. The factors behind a prosecutor’s decision to enter into a 
settlement agreement reflect the same concerns, and also should have an impact on the 
terms of the settlement agreement and the scope of the monitorship.  
A key factor in the settlement determination under the McNulty Memo is the “the 
existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program.”161 In at least one case, 
the government has turned to compliance consultants to help evaluate this factor. The US 
Attorney in Western Pennsylvania hired Compliance Systems Legal Group to investigate 
Mellon Bank’s compliance program as part of the US Attorney’s consideration of the 
                                                           
158 See infra Part IV.C.4. 
159 McNulty Memo, supra note 88, at 5. 
160 Morford Memo, supra note 152, at 2 
161 McNulty Memo, supra note 88, at 4. 
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McNulty Memo factors.162 Although Mellon Bank avoided criminal prosecution for the 
destruction of tax documents, its compliance program was found to be deficient, and its 
settlement agreement required the company to improve its compliance and ethics 
program and pay for a monitor to oversee the implementation of the program.163 In a 
different case, prosecutors found a clearly inadequate compliance program. Faro 
Technologies, which admitted in its settlement agreement to violating the FCPA, did not 
even address issues related to the FCPA in its compliance program or training even 
though it regularly conducted business in China, which put it at high risk for making 
corrupt payments.164 In both cases, the settlement agreement addressed these compliance 
program inadequacies and required improvement. 
In addition to the compliance program, prosecutors are also instructed to consider 
a “company’s compliance attitude”165 or, in other words, the corporation’s culture. The 
McNulty Memo requires prosecutors to look for a “corporate culture that encouraged, or 
at least condoned, such conduct, regardless of any compliance programs.” Likewise, in 
securities enforcement, the Seaboard Report tells enforcement lawyers to ask, “How did 
the misconduct arise? Is it the result of pressure placed on employees to achieve specific 
results, or a tone of lawlessness set by those in control of the company?”166 Through 
these enquiries, the government is trying to determine if the wrongful acts were 
committed by a small group of rogue employees (“bad apples”) who went against the 
grain of the rest of the corporation, or if corporate leadership had created a culture that 
rewarded and encouraged the wrongful acts in spite of having a compliance program that 
purported to prohibit such behavior (a “bad barrel”). If the investigation shows that a root 
cause of the problem is a “bad barrel,” then any settlement agreement sought by 
prosecutors should seek to address that problem. Accordingly, a monitor’s duties should 
typically serve those ends.  
Focusing specifically on the DOJ, according to the recent Morford Memo, 
monitorships are typically used to ensure the company has “effectively implemented 
ethics and compliance programs to address and reduce the risk of recurrence of the 
corporation’s misconduct.”167 Most monitorships in place as of the publication of the 
Morford Memo in March 2008 are consistent with the guidelines set out in that memo. 
                                                           
162 At the time, the Thompson Memo was in effect. See Settlement Agreement with Mellon Bank, Non-
Prosecution Agreement, (Aug. 14, 2006), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/Mellon060817.pdf (requiring Mellon Bank to 
reimburse the government for costs related to hiring Compliance Systems Legal Group); Interview with 
Win Swenson, Partner, Compliance Systems Legal Group, Warwick, Rhode Island, CORP. CRIME REP., 
April 26, 2004, at 10, 15. 
163 Mellon Bank, supra note 162.  
164 Faro Technologies, Non-Prosecution Agreement (June 3, 2008), at Appendix A, pp. 6-7. 
165 Rashkover, supra note 89 at 539. 
166 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Divisions, Exchange 
Act Release No. 44969 76, SEC Docket 220 (October 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm. supra note 89. 
167 Morford Memo, supra note 152, at 5. 
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The large majority of the monitors are charged with ensuring compliance with the 
settlement agreement, reviewing the compliance program related to the offence, 
recommending changes to existing compliance processes, and then reviewing the 
effectiveness of the implementation of those changes. In addition, in slightly under half 
the agreements, the monitor is charged with monitoring the company’s compliance with 
applicable federal laws. Interestingly, however, almost without exception, McNulty 
Memo-style language about a corporation’s compliance “attitude” or “culture” does not 
appear in the agreements. 
In the nine months since the Morford Memo, as of this writing, three additional 
monitorships have been imposed on companies through settlement agreements with the 
DOJ for violations of the FCPA. All three cases were handled by the DOJ’s Fraud 
Section and they use almost identical language for establishing the procedure for the 
selecting the monitor and the duties of the monitor. With respect to compliance programs, 
the monitors are required to oversee the implementation of a compliance program, ensure 
that the program is “appropriately designed,” and conduct annual follow-up reviews of 
the program.168 The agreements also state that the monitor should take “such steps as are 
necessary to develop an understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding any 
violation that may have occurred.”169 That broad language allows for significant 
interpretation, which may or may not include matters related to a corporation’s culture. 
However, two of these agreements qualify that language in that they specifically state that 
the monitors should not conduct their own investigations into past FCPA violations at 
these companies (and therefore may have to rely only on information provided to them by 
the corporation).170 There is no indication why these monitorships, (all agreed to within a 
few weeks of each other) were treated differently. 171 
                                                           
168 Faro Technologies, supra note 164, at Appendix C, ¶ 5; AGA Medical, Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
(June 3, 2008), at Attachment D, ¶ 6; and Willbros Group Inc., Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 14, 
2008), at Attachment D, ¶ 7. In addition, in all three cases, before the monitor conducts a review, the 
Monitor is required to develop a written work plan and make that plan available to the company and the US 
Attorney’s office for comment. 
169 See Faro Technologies, supra note 164, at Appendix C, ¶ 5(e)(i). 
170 The agreements state that “the parties do not intend that the monitor will conduct his or her own inquiry 
into those historical events.” Willbros, supra note 168, at Attachment D, ¶ 7(e)(i); AGA Medical, supra 
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states that the “monitor’s mandate is not to investigate historical misconduct.” Morford Memo, supra note 
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understanding of why and how the wrongdoing occurred would in most cases seem to be essential 
information in diagnosing what went wrong and then ensuring that the corporation implements an 
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explanation of the expected role of the monitor, which would also help explain the inclusion or exclusion of 
such terms in the agreement. 
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Although the agreements (either pre- or post-Morford) do not address the issue of 
corporate culture in so many words, in some cases the government appears to view 
certain negotiated terms as addressing those issues. For example, in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb’s DPA, the US Attorney who negotiated the agreement specifically stated that 
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s culture “greatly contributed to the criminal conduct.”172 
Employees in the company regularly used fraudulent means to hit aggressive sales and 
earnings targets between 2000 and 2001.173 The company engaged in similar conduct in 
the early 1990s and implemented controls to reduce that behavior, but corporate culture 
overrode those controls and the wrongful behavior reached new heights.174 In an attempt 
to correct these cultural problems, the US Attorney did not specifically charge the 
monitor with investigating the culture issues and making recommendations—though the 
monitor did have the power to “to take any steps he believes are necessary to comply 
with the terms of this Agreement” – but included certain structural reforms in the DPA. 
For example, the DPA required quarterly meetings between senior managers and the 
independent auditors, to help foster a culture of disclosure.175 In addition, the DPA 
required the CEO and CFO to make certain reports on transactions to the board, the 
monitor, and the company’s Chief Compliance Officer.176 Finally, the DPA required the 
company to implement a training program.177 In explaining the need for these 
requirements, the US Attorney who negotiated the DPA stated: “Many of the remedial 
measures in the deferred prosecution agreement—the top-level structural and governance 
changes, the reporting by senior management, and the training and education programs 
for key financial and legal personnel—are designed to spread knowledge and 
responsibility for doing the right thing throughout the Bristol-Myers organization.”178  
These kinds of comments demonstrate a desire on the part of the US Attorney to 
change the organization’s culture. Leaving aside, for now, questions about whether these 
negotiated terms are sufficient on their own to effect positive change to corporate ethical 
culture, the initial problem is that although the monitor is charged with overseeing the 
implementation and effectiveness of required compliance measures, the monitor’s exact 
role in this process is unclear.179 The terms of the agreement could allow the monitor to 
                                                           
172 Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corporate Citizenship: The 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of 5ew Jersey and Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1051, 1056 (2006) (stating that the company had a 
“disturbing corporate culture that favored secrecy over openness”). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 1057-58. 
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177 Id.  
178 Id. at 1058. (“A top-down commitment to honor and integrity, coupled with an educated and empowered 
workforce, undoubtedly will help Bristol-Myers demonstrate its commitment to exemplary corporate 
conduct during and after the two-year term of the deferred prosecution agreement.”) 
179 It may be that the retention contract between the corporation and the monitor, or some other documents 
that are not publicly available, contain more specific expectations than that contained in the settlement 
agreement. We are not aware of any case in which a contract has been entered into between the monitor 
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take on only an auditor role and simply check what the company has done, or the monitor 
could become a team member pushing and assisting with cultural change.180  
4. The Scope of the Monitorship 
Along with variation in the duties of the monitor, there has been variation in the 
scope of monitorships. These issues are clearly intertwined with the duties of the monitor 
discussed in the previous section, but in this section we try to add some clarity to the 
variations—both intentional and unintentional—around what role the monitor is expected 
to play. 
The Morford Memo recognizes that the monitor’s role must be appropriately 
designed and states: 
Neither the corporation nor the public benefits from employing a 
monitor whose role is too narrowly defined (and, therefore, prevents the 
monitor from effectively evaluating the reforms intended by the parties) or 
too broadly defined (and, therefore, results in the monitor engaging in 
activities that fail to facilitate the corporation's implementation of the 
reforms intended by the parties).181 
The monitor’s role should vary based on the circumstances and should be 
designed to allow the monitor to carry out her duties appropriately, without being overly 
intrusive. Based on the settlement agreements (including SEC agreements), we place the 
monitorships along a spectrum using four general categories, which from smallest scope 
to largest scope are: Advisor, Auditor, Associate, and Autocrat.  
In its most modest version, the monitor may simply serve an Advisor role. For 
example, although the DOJ listed Aaron Marcu as a monitor for Aurora Foods in its letter 
to the House Judiciary Committee,182 the settlement agreement appears to give the 
monitor very limited powers. According to the agreement, the monitor is referred to as an 
“outside consultant” that is to be hired “to advise Aurora regarding an appropriate 
compliance program.”183 The company is also required to “implement the 
recommendations made by that outside consultant.”184 The agreement further specifies 
that certain individuals must oversee the implementation of the compliance program, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and the government, or of any other particular documents that might govern the situation, so the 
corporation-monitor contract would be the logical place for any additional detail. The monitor contract in 
the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey was made publicly available. If this contract is 
representative of other corporation-monitor contracts, then these contracts do not provide additional 
clarification on these expectations as the document simply refers back to the DPA for the scope and terms 
of the monitor’s duties and powers. Also, the monitors we interviewed mentioned their settlement 
agreements for setting out their duties and not their contract with the company, which suggests that it is not 
important and it is the work plan that matters. 
180 See infra notes 182-195 and accompanying text (setting out different possible roles for the monitor). 
181 Morford Memo, supra note 152. 
182 Letter to John Conyers Jr., Chairman of the House Comm. on the Judiciary from Brian A. Benczowski, 
Principal Deputy Assistant General, May 15, 2008 (copy on file with authors).  
183 Aurora Foods, Non-Prosecution Agreement, at p. 3 (Jan. 22, 2001), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/Aurora010122.pdf. 
184 Id. 
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including an individual appointed as a compliance officer and a newly appointed 
independent director to serve on the audit committee.185 
At the other extreme—the Autocrat—monitors are given significant powers. The 
primary example is the appointment of Richard Breeden as the monitor for WorldCom 
following an SEC request for ancillary relief from the court. Initially, Mr. Breeden was 
appointed to ensure that the company did not destroy evidence, and to review 
compensation payments to ensure the company was not using excessive officer 
compensation as a form of “looting.”186 In a later consent decree, the monitor’s powers 
were expanded to include reviewing and making recommendations on the company’s 
entire corporate governance structure, including its compliance program.187 This resulted 
in Mr. Breeden issuing a 147-page report that included far-reaching recommendations on 
such controversial matters as shareholder nomination of directors, and a ban on the use of 
stock options for compensating corporate officers.188 Mr. Breeden also played a role in 
selecting and removing certain members of the board of directors, and determining to 
which potential acquirer the company should be sold.189  
Another example is the DPA for the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New 
Jersey (UMDNJ). In that agreement, the monitor had full access to all documents and 
information held by UMDNJ and at the monitor’s “discretion” could investigate any 
allegation of wrongdoing.190 In addition to reviewing and making recommendations on 
UMDNJ’s compliance program, the monitor had the “authority to require UMDNJ to 
take any steps he or she believes are necessary for UMDNJ to comply with the terms of 
this agreement” and was required to “ensure UMDNJ’s compliance with applicable 
federal and state laws.”191 During the course of the monitorship, the monitor, Herbert J. 
Stern, a former federal prosecutor and judge, filed reports alleging wrongdoing by 
various doctors and a dean, which led to employment terminations.192 The monitor 
employed various law and auditing firms to assist in his work, and after six months on the 
job submitted a bill for $5.8 million, which drew criticism because that figure was higher 
than the amount that UMDNJ had allegedly overbilled Medicaid.193 
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186 Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 89, 94-96 (2006). 
187 Id. at 98. 
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190 University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, at 2 (Dec. 29, 
2005), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/UMDNJ051229.pdf. 
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positions of General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer. Id. at 4. 
192 David Kocieniewski, Medical School Fires 2 Doctors in Wake of a Monitor Report, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
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In the middle are the Auditor and Associate roles. The Auditor assumes a role of 
assuring the DOJ that the corporation is doing what it says it is doing in terms of 
implementing internal controls and a new compliance program. The Auditor also may 
make recommendations for improvements where necessary. The Associate, on the other 
hand, conducts the work of an Auditor, but also functions more fully as a partner with the 
compliance officer, board of directors, or other relevant corporate officials. For each of 
these roles, the settlement agreement typically states that the monitor will evaluate the 
company’s compliance with the settlement agreement, review the company’s compliance 
program and make recommendations for improvement, oversee implementation of the 
recommended changes, conduct follow-up evaluations of the compliance program (e.g., 
annually for the next two years), and file reports with the company and the DOJ on the 
company’s progress.194 As discussed below, the monitor’s adoption of either the Auditor 
or Associate role has less to do with the written terms of the agreement, and more with 
the monitor’s chosen approach.195 
5. Monitor Independence 
Although the Morford Memo states that a monitor is “by definition” independent 
of the company and the government,196 sometimes the decision is made that a fully 
independent monitor is not necessary. Our research indicates that both civil and criminal-
side regulators are willing to consider monitorship structures of varying degrees of 
independence, depending on the perceived needs of the case,197 with less independent 
monitors typically serving an “advising” role.198 One civil-side regulator we spoke with 
described a spectrum, with certification by a firm’s in-house counsel or internal audit 
department on one end, review by a firm’s outside counsel in the middle of the spectrum, 
and a fully independent review by a third party at the far end. According to this regulator, 
certifications or internal compliance audits are generally considered to be adequate where 
the conduct in question is less serious and/or the review can be fairly easily verified on 
objective bases.  
Where the conduct is especially serious, the judgments required are subjective, 
and the regulator is not satisfied with the steps the firm has taken so far, the regulator is 
more likely to insist on retaining a wholly independent monitor.199 This regulatory staffer 
                                                           
194 See Willbros, supra note 168; See also Computer Associates Int’l. Inc., Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
(Sept. 22, 2004), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/ComputerAssoc.pdf. 
195 See infra Part V.A. 
196 Morford Memo, supra note 152, at 4-5. 
197 On the Criminal Side, see Ingersoll Rand Ltd., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, para. 9 (Oct. 31, 2007), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/Ingersoll071114.pdf (stating that 
the company has hired an outside consultant and not listing any independence requirements for that 
consultant).  
198 See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text (describing the Advisor role). 
199 This regulator stated, in part:  
It depends on the seriousness of the conduct and the scope of harm. So, sometimes you 
might have what I’d call an “easy fix,” and in this case we might just require the firm’s 
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pointed out that the first thing a firm often does, when it gets into trouble with a 
regulator, is to retain outside counsel or an accountant to conduct an internal review. 
Where credible outside counsel has already done substantial work on the problem, it can 
be burdensome and largely pointless to require the firm, as a term of a settlement, to 
bring another party in to redo the same work. For example, as soon as the DOJ started 
investigating Bristol-Myers Squibb, the company hired Frederick Lacey, a former US 
Attorney and federal judge, to review the company’s compliance program and internal 
controls as an independent advisor.200 A year later, in a settlement agreement with the 
SEC, the company agreed to retain Lacey as an independent advisor.201 The following 
year Lacey became an independent monitor for the company under the DPA with the 
DOJ.202 Although Lacey had earlier been retained by the company, this apparently did 
not affect his independence since he later recommended that the company terminate the 
employment of the CEO that had hired him.203 
A civil-side regulator interviewee also told us that staffers recognize that a multi-
year ban on subsequent business relationships between monitor and firm can be a 
burdensome requirement for all involved – the consultant as well as the firm. As a result, 
that regulator no longer automatically requires this as a condition of every monitorship. 
There may be other factors that constrain independence – for example, if the decision is 
made that the monitor must have extensive experience in the industry, or must have 
specialized expertise, there may be a limited number of potential monitors that are 
qualified and willing to take on the engagement. In those situations, a monitor’s prior 
business relationships with a subject firm may not necessarily be a disqualifier. The 
appropriate question is whether the level of independence is sufficient, not whether it is 
complete. As one regulator described it, 
There were enough questions about the management and the firm 
that we weren’t just going to rely on their representations. We wanted 
somebody independent of the firm to verify. So we wanted a more formal 
auditor relationship and the sufficient independence of that was satisfied. 
Basically if you’re independent enough to be their financial auditor then 
that was sufficient for this engagement. It didn’t have to be somebody 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in-house compliance department to conduct a review or audit, and then to certify that 
changes have been made. … Maybe we would have the firm’s outside counsel do it 
instead sometimes. At the other end of the spectrum is the “big fix,” where we might 
require the firm to hire an independent consultant. As a term of the settlement, that 
independent consultant would be precluded from working with the firm after this 
engagement, maybe for a period of two years. Maybe we’d put an independent person on 
their Board of Directors that they’d have to report to. 
200 Christie and Hanna, supra note 172, at 1054. Lacey had previously served as an independent 
administrator in DOJ consent decree with the Teamsters union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Jacobs, 
supra note 23, at 205-207.  
201 Bristol Myers Squibb, News Release, Bristol-Myers Squibb Statement on SEC Settlement, Aug. 4, 2004, 
available at http://investor.bms.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=106664&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=600607&highlight=. 
202 Christie and Hanna, supra note 172, at 1054. 
203 Stephanie Saul, A Corporate 5anny Turns Assertive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006. 
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brand new. And that it was - the context with their industry experience was 
an important factor for us. 
For those involved in the process, the degree of independence was not a central 
concern. Both regulators and monitors told us that, ultimately, the monitors’ own 
professional reputation and integrity were what made them behave responsibly in the role 
and avoid being captured.204 
B. Selecting the Monitor 
1. Selection Process 
Monitors are selected through a variety of methods. In most cases the DOJ selects 
the monitor, often after “consultation” with the company,205 or the DOJ and the company 
select a monitor who is “mutually agreed upon.”206 In other situations, the company 
selects a monitor and the government retains a veto right.207 In at least one case the court 
has selected the monitor from a selection of three candidates agreed to by the corporation 
and the government.208 The monitors we spoke to were selected through several of these 
options. 
The Morford Memo approves of the use of any of these methods, though – 
reflecting the memo’s origins in the scandal surrounding John Ashcroft’s appointment as 
a monitor by a US Attorney’s office – the government’s final selection cannot be made 
solely by the US Attorney but must be through an ad hoc committee, and final approval 
must be given by the Deputy Attorney General.209 In the three cases since that memo, 
however, the DOJ has used the veto method of selection.210 The debate about monitor 
selection methods has even reached Congress, as one proposed bill seeks to require the 
DOJ to use an open competition for monitorships.211 
                                                           
204 We discuss independence farther below, see infra notes 209-211 and accompanying text. 
205 See Stryker Orthopedics, Non-Prosecution Agreement (Oct. 25, 2005), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/Stryker051025.pdf. 
206 See America Online Inc., Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 14, 2004), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/AOL041214.pdf; See also Aurora Foods, supra 
note 183, Baker Hughes Inc., Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Apr. 26, 2007), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/BHughes070411.pdf (both requiring a 
“mutually acceptable” monitor). 
207 Faro Technologies, supra note 164, at Appendix C, ¶ 2 (“Department retains the right, in its sole 
discretion, to accept or reject any Monitor proposed by FARO pursuant to the Agreement.”) 
208 Computer Associates, supra note 194. 
209 Morford Memo, supra note 152, at 3. 
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“mutually acceptable” monitor, because the “mutually acceptable” language gives the Department more 
control over the selection. These three cases go against the trend that interviewee had identified, but they 
are all from the Fraud Section. Thus, it is difficult to say if future DPAs from outside the Fraud Section will 
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211 The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008, H.R. 6492, 110th Cong. § 5 (2008). This Bill 
would require the Attorney General to establish a national list of potential monitors and establish rules for 
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Significantly, the monitor is typically selected after the settlement agreement has 
been negotiated and signed. This takes the identity of the monitor out of the initial 
settlement negotiations. It puts the company in the interesting position of agreeing to a 
contract, one essential element of which remains undetermined.  
During a selection process where the company is afforded some significant voice 
in the process, it is not uncommon for potential monitors to make a presentation to the 
company. This interview process gives the company the opportunity to determine 
whether a particular monitor has the personality, skills, and experience, necessary to 
provide value to the company, as well as achieving the government’s objectives. Our 
research does not answer the question of whether the DOJ also interviews potential 
candidates, although none of our interviewees told us that they had been so interviewed. 
However, at least one monitor we spoke with was aware of instances in which the 
government had exercised its “veto” power and rejected a company’s choice of monitor, 
either because of a perceived conflict of interest or because the proposed monitor was not 
thought to have the necessary qualifications. The next section turns to the qualifications 
of those monitors. 
2. Monitors’ Background and Experience 
There are several common traits among monitors. One common trait, especially 
on the criminal side, is the lack of experience in conducting a monitorship.  Many 
monitors seem to have been retained for only a single engagement. If the government 
continues its use of monitorships, then experienced monitors may become more common. 
For example, Timothy Dickinson served as the monitor in Monsanto and was recently 
selected as the “independent consultant” for Delta & Pine in a settlement with the SEC. 
George Stamboulidis served as the monitor for Merrill Lynch and Bank of New York. In 
addition, he serves as a “private monitor” for other companies, which presumably also 
gives him valuable experience as a monitor. He estimates that he spends seventy percent 
of his day as a monitor in some form.212 On the civil side, for a fairly small community of 
lawyers, SEC or FINRA monitorships and corporate internal investigations more 
generally form a substantial part of their practice. 
On the other hand, some fear that the selection process will often not favor 
experienced monitors. For example, one observer had the following perception of the 
selection process (though others we spoke to disagreed): 
Typically an Assistant US Attorney or an Assistant District 
Attorney will leave to go into private practice; a case will come up in the 
office where they’ll decide to do a deferred prosecution agreement. 
Somebody will call the guy who’s left and say “Hey Charlie would you 
like to do this?” And he says “Sure.” Looking for business, it’s sort of like 
being a prosecutor again, sounds interesting and so he does it. That’s how 
he gets appointed; somebody knows him, he’s a friend. And that may be 
the only one he does for his entire life… 
                                                                                                                                                                             
their selection that further the goal of creating “an open, public, and competitive process for the selection of 
such monitors.” Id. at §5(c).  
212 Interview with George A. Stamboulidis, Partner, Baker Hostetler, 5ew York, 5ew York, CORP. CRIME 
REP., (Sept. 18, 2006), at 11. 
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A second common trait is that monitors are typically former prosecutors or other 
government employees. From the list of forty monitors submitted by the DOJ to the 
House Judiciary Committee on May 15, 2008, thirty were former government employees, 
including 23 former prosecutors.213 A separate review of 25 monitorships found that at 
least 17 were ex-prosecutors, and others included former federal judges, an SEC 
Chairman, and an SEC General Counsel.214 The monitors we interviewed viewed their 
backgrounds as a positive and highlighted their prosecutorial experience and their 
presumed professional judgment as the most likely reasons for their selection. A number 
of them also thought that their experience on “both sides” – i.e., as prosecutors and also 
representing companies on white collar crime matters – equipped them to be monitors. 
One monitor stated, “I used my professional experience and training as a prosecutor and 
also as a defense attorney. You have to wear both hats, see things from different 
perspectives.” Another described key skills as “[l]earning how to investigate and quote-
unquote prosecute, tempering that with an understanding gained as a defense lawyer 
about the mitigating and absolute defenses against certain conduct, and overlaying that, 
appreciating that you have competing interests.” 
Several people we interviewed raised concerns about the government selecting 
ex-prosecutors as monitors. However, the typical case may not be the selection of a 
former superior, as in the selection of John Ashcroft, or some other conflict of interest, 
but the DOJ selecting someone they know, trust, and are comfortable working with. This 
may result in a prosecutor selecting a former colleague to be a monitor, as suggested in 
quote above. In addition, the company itself may select an ex-prosecutor in an attempt to 
win the trust of the government and signal their willingness to comply with the settlement 
agreement. One monitor stated, 
I think the reason that you see so many people who do this who 
have recently been in the government is really because they have a 
credibility component and an independence component from the 
perspective of the regulator who has to approve them. … [I]f you are the 
company looking to retain somebody, you want to have somebody the 
regulator is going to view as a credible force. … [Y]ou sort of only have 
one shot at it and you want a household name about whose integrity no 
one is going to call in to question . . . . 
Another monitor said, 
I think the comfort level that the government might have in the 
monitor is important not only to the government but the more credibility 
the monitor has with the government the better off the company can be too 
because if the company has a monitor who has done an effective job and 
has made recommendations that are going to be received and accepted by 
the government, that’s good for all concerned. 
In addition to their prosecutorial or regulatory experience, monitors commonly 
assumed that they were selected for their knowledge of the substantive law related to the 
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wrongdoing in question, and their experience in that industry or with similar 
corporations. When asked whether compliance program professionals215 could be 
effective monitors, many of the monitors we interviewed were skeptical. The primary 
basis of that skepticism was the view that compliance management professionals do not 
have the necessary “legal expertise.” In general, the monitors were not concerned that 
they themselves did not have experience in corporate compliance or similar managerial 
positions. As one monitor pointed out,  
[l]awyers do this type of work all the time, they’re used to bringing 
in the necessary experts to assist their role, so if the monitor needs a 
compensation specialist they can always bring one in. Lawyers know how 
to bring in people to augment their work.   
Not surprisingly, compliance consultants we interviewed raised concerns about 
the heavy use of ex-prosecutors and similar attorneys as monitors. Their primary 
concerns related to these monitors’ lack of experience in implementing and evaluating 
compliance programs in a way that takes into account how those programs are embedded 
in the corporation’s culture. Although a lawyer experienced with the FCPA, for example, 
can provide necessary expertise on policies the company needs to adopt to avoid 
violating the law (e.g., what risks to be aware of, what types of payments are not 
defensible), that expertise may be insufficient to ensure that the corporation’s employees 
actually comply with those policies. This is where issues related to a corporation’s culture 
(e.g., incentives, social norms) are important for understanding future compliance. Thus, 
the changes implemented may not be sufficient to have a long-term impact on the 
corporation. 
To illustrate these concerns, one consultant brought up the old joke of a person 
dropping her keys in the middle of the street but looking for the lost keys at the side of 
the road by a street lamp. When asked why she was looking there, she responds “because 
that’s where the light is.” As applied here, it means that monitors without experience in 
establishing compliance programs will rely on what they do know216 or, as discussed 
further below,217 will rely on indicators that are easy to measure but may be misleading.  
Although monitors may bring in teams of professionals with the skills and 
experience that the monitor lacks, this may not reassure all compliance consultants. First, 
the monitor may not understand the relevant professional experience they lack. In a 
published interview, a member of the original commission that worked on the 1991 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines criticized high-profile monitors, stating they “lack 
background or, frankly, interest in understanding the substantial body of compliance best 
practices.”218 Second, as one compliance consultant pointed out, the corporation must pay 
the bill to bring in these other parties even though it has little or no control over who the 
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monitor hires and how many billable hours they can charge. To the extent that the 
monitor must learn on the job and bring in outsiders as part of this learning process, 
corporate officers may come to resent the process. This can impact the monitorship’s 
legitimacy and its chances for long-term success. This is perhaps especially true if a 
monitor is selected simply for his or her name recognition, which is done presumably to 
add credibility.  
If, as the Morford Memo states, one of the key roles of the monitor is to ensure 
that the company adopts an effective compliance program,219 then experience with 
compliance programs from a managerial perspective would seem to be an essential 
qualification for most monitorships. As a former prosecutor stated:  
One of the reasons why the deferred prosecution agreements 
require a monitor to be put in place is that the prosecutor's office has no 
experience or skills to analyze whether a company is reforming its internal 
governance practices. That's just not something that prosecutors do. 
Instead, they need to find someone who does understand corporate forms 
and operations, and has the time and resources to monitor the company's 
progress. 
This statement, which is uncontroversial, seems inconsistent with the decision to 
consistently choose individuals with only prosecutorial or technical legal expertise with 
respect to compliance programs.  
C. Conducting the Monitorship 
In the course of a monitorship, the monitor develops a work plan, conducts his 
investigation, advises the organization as to what changes are required, evaluates the 
implementation and effectiveness of those changes, and produces a report containing his 
evaluation and recommendations. Over the next two years or so, the monitor is often 
required to conduct annual follow-up evaluations with formal written reports. In this 
section, we take a closer look out how monitors conduct these activities. 
1. Developing and Implementing a Work Plan 
A monitorship typically begins with the development of a work plan. The work 
plan sets out who the monitor will interview, what documents she will review, and the 
other work of the monitor and her team. Significantly, in many cases the work plan is 
developed after the settlement agreement has been finalized and the monitor appointed, 
often by the monitor herself on a rolling basis. In other cases the work plan is negotiated 
with the company and the government. One interviewee had the impression that 
negotiated work plans, developed in advance of the start of the monitorship, were 
becoming more commonplace.  
The negotiation of a work plan has occurred both formally and informally. The 
settlement agreement itself can require the joint development of the plan. For example, in 
the Baker Hughes DPA, the agreement specified a process under which the monitor 
submitted a work plan to both the company and the DOJ for their comments before the 
project began.220 All three of the monitorships entered into since the Morford Memo have 
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required that the monitor submit a work plan to both the company and the DOJ for 
comment.221 In other cases, monitors reported taking the initiative and calling a meeting 
with the company and DOJ to ensure everyone had a clear understanding of expectations. 
Finally, the company may take the initiative. One monitor stated that as part of his 
presentation to the company during the company’s selection process, he described the 
work plan he would implement.  
In developing a work plan, the monitors we spoke to told us they generally used 
the settlement agreement to establish the bounds of their investigation, and stated they 
would not take on tasks that would go outside their duties as stated in the agreement. The 
terms of the agreement, however, may contain substantial room for interpretation by the 
monitor.  
One area open to interpretation is whether and how to investigate the 
corporation’s culture. As stated earlier, settlement agreements do not contain language 
explicitly charging the monitor to provide recommendations on managing a corporation’s 
culture, but some monitors recognize the importance of corporate culture and assume 
responsibility for making recommendations on those issues. For example, the monitor in 
the AOL case, James Robinson, and two colleagues who worked on the monitorship with 
him, published an article describing their views on how a monitor should conduct his 
work.222 In the article, they state that the AOL DPA tasked the monitor with a “mandate 
to review and monitor a compliance culture as it relates to business practices and revenue 
recognition.”223 The paragraph cited by Robinson as giving the monitor this mandate 
states that the monitor shall review “the effectiveness” of AOL’s “internal control 
measures,” “training related to these internal control measures,” AOL’s “sign-off and 
approval procedures,” and the “corporate code of conduct.”224 One of our interviewees (a 
monitor operating under a comparable mandate) expressed a similar view, and perceived 
a similar link between compliance program policies and procedures and the corporation’s 
culture:  
I wasn't appointed to change the corporate culture at [company]. 
That said, the broad topics that I was there to examine and report on went 
deeply into the culture and required me to sort of make observations about 
the culture and about how it influenced the compliance of the company, 
and as a consequence, at least, my perception was dealing on almost a 
daily basis with questions of corporate culture. 
Although it is unclear from Robinson’s article what these monitors did to examine 
or review their company’s “compliance culture,” their direct discussion of culture 
suggests a distinctly different approach from some other monitors. For example, when 
one monitor we interviewed was asked about reviewing the company’s culture, the 
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monitor told us, in effect, that it was hard to even know what the term meant. The 
monitor observed that he could objectively look at processes and procedures, but that if 
he wanted to be able to measure results it would be difficult to even determine how to 
measure corporate culture. That monitor speculated that some other monitorships might 
be concerned with corporate culture, but that his monitorship was intended to be limited. 
Interestingly, the settlement agreement that monitor was working under charged the 
monitor with essentially the same duties as the AOL monitor, focused around reviewing 
new internal controls.  
Even among those monitors who consider themselves to be engaging with issues 
of corporate culture, it is unclear whether their use of the term matches the use of the 
term by compliance professionals. In his article, the AOL monitor used the phrase 
“compliance culture” but he did not specifically discuss how, if at all, his team attempted 
to measure the corporation’s culture. That monitor’s approach may or may not be 
consistent with current best practices from the perspective of compliance professionals. 
For example, a common term in settlement agreements requires the company to 
implement some form of anonymous hotline to allow employees to report wrongdoing. If 
the monitor views her task very narrowly, then she will simply ensure that the hotline has 
been implemented, that it is being monitored (perhaps by someone who reports to the 
audit committee), and that employees are made aware of the hotline through training. 
Although reviewing policies and procedures can ensure the hotline has been 
implemented, it tells the company very little about its effectiveness. For example, many 
employees refuse to report significant wrongdoing to hotlines due to a belief that the 
organization will do nothing to correct the problem and a fear of retaliation, even if the 
hotline is anonymous.225 Unless the monitor has a sense of the organization’s culture and 
the pressures and social norms related to reporting wrongdoing, the monitor will not 
know whether the hotline is an effective tool.  
Likewise, reflecting the comment made earlier about looking for keys under the 
lamp post because that is where the light is, a monitor who is not a compliance 
professional may misconstrue information coming in about the corporation’s culture. For 
example, in a published interview, one attorney who later served as a monitor stated that 
the fact that a company’s hotline was rarely used by employees—and when it was used it 
was for minor, personal matters— provided evidence of a positive corporate culture.226 
Compliance consultants we interviewed, however, seem universally to agree that the use 
or non-use of a hotline is not a good indicator of a corporation’s compliance culture or 
measure of the level of wrongdoing within the organization. Instead, to get a sense of the 
corporation’s culture, they would recommend using surveys, focus groups, and other 
similar measures.227  
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Overall, we found significant variation in how monitors conducted their work. All 
seemed to review documents related to policies and procedures. All monitors also 
conducted interviews, but some stated that it was unnecessary to talk to employees below 
upper management. Those latter monitors focused solely on the “tone at the top,” which 
can create a biased view of the organization.228 With respect to lower level employees, 
those monitors seemed to focus simply on removing the wrongdoers. Other monitors, 
however, conducted one-on-one interviews with employees at various levels of the 
company on the view that people were more likely to be candid in that environment, and 
even engaged in “surprise” visits to branch offices to interview employees before 
management had a chance to prepare for them. In addition, some did not rely solely on 
interviews to understand the company, but sat in on meetings where decisions were 
made. Some intervened in corporate decisions early, while others tried to remain more in 
the background, on the belief that: 
… what you want to do … is to allow the business and compliance and 
legal people to tackle it and to observe how they tackle it. And then to 
intervene if and only if they're not handling it properly, and then, finally, 
report to the government on it, how it all went, rather than run to the 
government when an issue first arises and seek government intervention or 
seek yourself to impose the solution, because then you're not teaching the 
company anything. 
 In sum, how monitors view their obligations under the terms of the settlement 
agreement will influence how they establish a work plan, which will influence the 
information they collect, who they interview, and what aspects of the organization’s 
operations they investigate. This shapes the entire nature of the monitorship (and in some 
cases the choice between what we identified earlier as the Auditor and Associate roles), 
and ultimately what recommendations they make and how they report their findings. 
These decisions seem to be based more on the background and experience of the monitor 
than on the terms of the settlement agreement or the negotiations leading up to the 
settlement agreement. 
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In making these decisions, monitors learn by trial and error (at the company’s 
expense) and without the benefit of other monitors’ experience. The monitors we 
interviewed typically were not able to supplement their knowledge by consulting with 
other monitors, except rarely and on an ad hoc or informal basis, before developing work 
plans and starting monitorships of their own. Nor could they rely on other monitor reports 
as guidelines, as most were non-public. Several monitors expressed a strong desire for a 
forum in which to share their insights and learn from the experiences of other monitors. 
Without efforts by the government to attempt to capture the lessons of monitorships, 
however, it seems unlikely to occur on its own. Government intervention may be needed 
because some monitors may only conduct one monitorship and have little incentive to 
participate, while others that may seek additional monitorships in the future may view 
such information as proprietary.229 For example, one monitor stated:  
I think there’s also the dynamic that people are competing with 
one another …. It’s kind of like in your world, you know the other people 
who are in your space. Sometimes you collaborate with them, sometimes 
you don’t. 
2. Impacting the Organization 
The mere presence of a monitor has the potential to create significant change in 
how the corporation approaches its internal controls and compliance and ethics program. 
First, it forces the company to direct attention and resources to compliance and ethics.230 
For some corporations, compliance programs are simply a cost that that they try to 
minimize. The company seeks to “buy” just enough of a compliance program that it has 
some protection in the event that internal wrongdoing comes to light.231 The settlement 
agreement and presence of a monitor forces such corporations to direct more resources to 
this function and in some cases even to hire an officer for a new position of Chief Ethics 
and Compliance Officer (CECO), or develop a compliance committee on the board of 
directors.232 Second, the monitor can grant legitimacy and power to the CECO. As noted 
earlier, the CECO may sometimes be pressured to end investigations or otherwise not live 
up to the job’s requirements.233 The monitor gives the CECO more clout to resist that 
pressure. For example, one CECO reported using the monitor to ensure that management 
and the board would support what the CECO wanted to do. By putting the CECO’s 
recommendations in the monitor’s report, the monitor essentially forced management and 
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the board to agree to a plan they might have otherwise resisted.234 Likewise, one 
interviewee stated: 
There will be competing views within the corporation. The lawyers 
in the corporation may not have the standing that they ought to, and they 
may take one position, the business people may take another, and the 
[monitor] is in a position where he can, forgive the whole phrase, speak 
softly, but carry a big stick.  
Third, the presence of a monitor can be a sufficiently disruptive force to cause the 
company to conduct a meaningful re-evaluation of its practices. One monitor noted that 
because there was a “cop on the beat” at the corporation, employees started to act as they 
ought to under the compliance program. Eventually, the monitor hoped, appropriate 
social norms would develop and, due also to the other reforms, officers and employees 
within the corporation would continue to act that way after the monitor was gone.235 
Although the presence of the monitor can have an immediate impact, to sustain 
this impact over the long-term the corporation must be committed to the underlying 
reform goals behind the monitorship process, or at least the idea of adopting a meaningful 
compliance program. To do this, the monitors agreed that there must be some degree of 
buy-in from the corporation and trust between the monitor and corporation. As mentioned 
earlier, there is always the potential for corporate resentment to the monitor’s presence 
and the costs they are imposing on the corporation. To get the necessary buy-in, some 
monitors commented on the need to have a meaningful dialogue with the company, as 
opposed to simply lecturing the company.236 Some monitors believe (and many 
compliance professionals agree) that if reforms are to have a lasting impact, they need to 
be the product of an endogenous learning process at the company, and not imposed in a 
top-down manner.237 This approach appears to be in significant contrast with the 
approach used by Richard Breeden at WorldCom. Mr. Breeden’s Restoring Trust report 
seemed to consist of his own views as to what that corporation needed to do, as opposed 
to working with the management team to develop solutions with them that made the most 
sense for that company. Of course, one could argue that WorldCom was so pervasively 
corrupt that a monitor’s only hope for success would be to adopt an Autocrat role. Yet, at 
least one monitor we spoke with described a decision to define the assignment in direct 
distinction to the Breeden model: 
Well, I don't know that much about how Mr. Breeden went about 
his job, but reading his report led me to think that he may have a different 
view of how you handle this than I did. That is to say, I think, and maybe it 
was a function of the company he was in, or the circumstances, I don't 
mean to second guess him, but my impression was that he was much more 
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coming up with solutions and imposing them on management than doing 
the sort of advocacy that I advocate …. I would say that I set that 
paradigm, if you will, and worked against it. Whether it's a fair 
description of Mr. Breeden or not, I sort of created that image of how one 
might do the monitorship and then I worked against it, because I didn't 
think it was - as I got into my job - I didn't think it was the right way to 
handle things. … But I hasten to add …that there are times when you've 
got to say, this is the way it's going to be. When there's a serious problem, 
or something that really requires immediate attention, or raises very clear 
ethical issues. Plainly, under those circumstances, you don't wait around 
or allow the company to take anything less than the completely ethical 
position on a given issue.  
3. Accountability and Role Conflict 
In addition to advising the corporation on its compliance program, the monitor is 
also charged with monitoring the corporation’s compliance with the settlement 
agreement, and may be under an obligation to disclose or investigate other relevant 
instances of wrongdoing.238 Thus, the role contains inherent tensions.239  
The majority of our monitor interviewees agreed that there was some tension built 
into their role, but they thought it had a minimal impact on their work. Some monitors 
pointed out that their role did not contain any more conflicts than the kinds of roles they 
were accustomed to as lawyers and prosecutors. Others told us that the conflict was 
minimal, either because everyone understood the monitor’s position as an independent 
and credible third party, or because all parties ultimately wanted the same thing: for the 
company to adopt an effective compliance program and for the monitor to be able to 
verify that the evidence shows that such a program was in fact adopted. As discussed 
further below, this smoothing over of the inherent tensions in the role may create other 
problems. 
In terms of accountability, the Morford Memo’s second principle states, “A 
monitor is an independent third party, not an employee or agent of the corporation or of 
the government.”240 The monitors we spoke with generally endorsed that position. While 
DPAs are filed with the court, the monitors we spoke with did not report having a 
significant relationship with the court. Some monitors suggested that they were generally 
accountable to the relevant regulator or prosecutor, in the sense of writing their report for 
that audience. Among the monitors we spoke to, however, many had concluded that in 
their final analysis they were answerable only to themselves, and that their actions were 
constrained by the desire to maintain their own professional reputation. This raised 
concerns for others: 
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monitors aren’t infallible, they can run amok, they can miss things, 
they can overcharge, they can create more problems than they solve, and 
they’ve got to be answerable to somebody.  
4. Reports and Follow-Up 
At the completion of the initial investigation and during various other stages of 
the monitorship, the monitor is required to draft a written report and present it to the 
company and the government. Some monitors sought input from the company in drafting 
the report. One monitor stated: 
Sure, the monitor wants to write a good report that makes useful 
recommendations; so if they show a draft to the company, the company 
can say maybe you just got this one wrong, and we can show you 
information that you made the wrong decision, and they will be able to 
persuade the monitor or not. 5ot letting them talk is like a doctor giving a 
pain reliever and not asking if it’s working. 
In another case, the settlement agreement prohibited the monitor from 
sharing the report with the company until a preliminary version had been 
submitted to the government.241 Any concerns the company had with the report 
were to be submitted in writing to the government and the monitor, and the 
monitor could then respond to the comments as he saw fit.242  
During their investigation and drafting of the report, the monitors had a 
variety of experiences with respect to their interactions with the government. 
Although some monitors indicated an ongoing dialogue with the government 
independent of the company, others reached out to the government only if they 
reached an impasse within the company. Still others indicated that their only 
contact with the government was the submission of reports. In general, structured 
input from the government during the monitor’s investigation and development of 
the report did not seem to be the norm. Instead, the government simply reviewed 
the report as submitted. The general impression was that these reports were read 
closely and the government would have questions for the monitor. However, as 
discussed below, no structured institutional mechanism existed for deploying or 
leveraging the learning beyond that reading for that particular case.  In one case—
Bristol-Myers Squibb—the settlement agreement required that the company, 
including the CEO and general counsel, meet each quarter with the US Attorney’s 
Office and the monitor in conjunction with the filing of the monitor’s reports.243 
Such a formal meeting process seemed to be unique, however. 
With few exceptions,244 the monitor’s report was not made public. There 
are several arguments in favor of making the reports public. First, the reports 
would allow monitors to learn from each others’ experience. Second, it would 
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provide the greater compliance community with additional information on what 
the government is looking for with respect to being able to demonstrate that a 
compliance program is effective. Third, it provides greater accountability to the 
public, since interested parties would be able to determine if corporations were in 
fact rehabilitated, or if they “got off easy” for their wrongful behavior. 
On the other hand, most monitors thought that a non-public report 
provided significant benefits to the monitorship process. The primary benefit was 
providing an environment for open communication, as stated by one monitor: 
[T]the chances of identifying and observing . . . important issues 
and corporate behavior go way up if your report isn’t going to be on the 
front page of the business section of The 5ew York Times. You know, 
people are going to be much more willing to even seek you out, or at least 
answer your questions. I’ve found that there were people hungry to talk to 
me when I did my job. 
5. Cause for Concern in Conducting the Monitorship 
The combination of settlement agreement language that is open to interpretation 
and the selection of monitors without a background in compliance and ethics programs 
can lead to a monitorship that follows a simple Advisor or Auditor model regardless of 
what the situation calls for. Under this model, the monitor looks for technical compliance 
and the presence of the appropriate policies and procedures, but does not go deeper into 
the workings of the organization to determine if those policies and procedures are 
supported by an organizational culture that will ensure they are effective over the long 
term. Although the Auditor model may be appropriate in some situations,245 for 
organizations with a history of significant wrongdoing it does not ensure against the 
possibility that the corporation only adopts a “paper program.” 
This problem can be somewhat alleviated through a work plan, developed jointly 
and in advance, which clarifies all parties’ expectations of the monitorship. It is unclear if 
the joint, ex ante development of work plans is becoming standard practice. The work 
plan, however, may still not force a monitor from an Auditor role to an Associate role. 
The DOJ hires the monitor for its expertise in these areas. The prosecutors involved may 
not know the right questions to ask or what is required for a successful work plan that 
ensures the monitor adequately studies the organization’s culture. The corporation, which 
wants to ensure it receives positive reports from the monitor and completes the 
monitorship with minimal disruption and cost, may push for an Auditor role. In addition, 
the selection of the monitor may not be providing the type of expertise needed, and 
therefore the monitor is also not pushing for a deeper investigation. Thus, although the 
settlement agreement may be drafted to ensure the corporation adopts an effective 
compliance and ethics program, no one present during a work plan negotiation may be 
pushing for what it would actually take to develop, implement, and test a compliance 
program, based on best practices from compliance experts. This is not to say that 
something akin to the Auditor model is never appropriate, but in situations where there is 
widespread wrongdoing and significant reform is needed, the current choices seem to 
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work against the more comprehensive Associate model being adopted when it would be 
the most valuable model to use. 
Furthermore, a corporation may argue that an expensive and lengthy monitorship 
potentially required by the Associate model harms current shareholders.246 This would 
mirror the criticisms of Sarbanes Oxley section 404 to the effect that the mandatory 
procedures are expensive and provide little benefit.247 Instead of an expensive 
monitorship, corporations can argue that they will agree to adopt and improve their 
compliance programs, but that a monitor will not add much value beyond what they 
would get from hiring a compliance consultant, for example. If a monitor is imposed, the 
company will use those arguments to push for a more limited Auditor or Advisor role. 
Multiplying these effects is the possibility that financial industry regulators will share 
these concerns, along with a desire to move the case forward, close the file, and return the 
corporation “to the fold.” This may partially explain the difference between the corporate 
regulatory monitorships and those in the non-corporate (and especially RICO) context. 
Corporations, unlike mob-ridden unions, attract a certain presumptive support from 
professional regulators. They are not utterly “broken,” there is no public appetite for 
government to “run” public corporations, and they serve important public and private 
functions, so one should tread lightly. 
D. Termination and Post-Monitorship 
Although settlement agreements commonly allow for the monitorship period to be 
extended if needed or for the agreement to be terminated upon breach by the corporation, 
thereby releasing the government from its obligations, monitorships seem to end when 
the originally stated time expires. As one example, Bristol-Myers Squibb’s monitorship 
ended at the expiration of its term, even though additional wrongdoing had been 
discovered and the CEO was forced out due to involvement in that wrongdoing.248 The 
monitor’s report, however, praised the company for its “reformation of the company’s 
corporate culture into one that embraces and endorses a commitment to compliance, 
ethics, integrity and excellence, and encourages open and participatory communication 
throughout the organization.”249 The monitor also praised the company’s “outstanding 
global compliance program whose policies, processes and procedures are designed to 
ensure a culture of integrity and ethics that enables BMS to conduct its business 
worldwide in compliance with all applicable laws, regulations and other governing 
policies.”250 Strikingly, only a few months later, the company reached another settlement 
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with the DOJ and paid over $500 million for wrongdoing related to fraudulent pricing 
and marketing practices.251 As part of the new agreement, Bristol-Myers Squibb entered a 
Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the Office of Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, which required the company to adopt 
numerous compliance program features.252 Although some of the wrongful conduct 
giving rise to this settlement occurred during the time the monitorship was in effect, the 
US Attorney agreed to the settlement based in part on the monitor’s account of how the 
company had improved its compliance program.253 
Once a monitorship ends, ideally, as indicated by Jacobs in relation to union 
trusteeships, a debriefing process should take place.254 This is a necessary process to 
build a foundation of knowledge on what practices have worked and what have not, and 
how the process can be improved. This is not being done, however, either through a 
community of monitors or by the government.  
The absence of meaningful follow-up means it is difficult to vouch for the 
accountability or success of monitorships. As one of our interviewees memorably put it,  
Maybe it turned out okay, maybe it didn’t, maybe nobody knows, 
because there’s nobody out there evaluating these things. And unless a 
company gets caught doing something improper again nobody may find 
out whether the deferred prosecution agreement worked or didn’t work. 
Although our analysis has generally discussed criminal-side and civil-side 
monitorships together, there are significant differences in the contexts in which the 
monitorships are enacted that should be taken into account. Most important, unlike a 
regulator, a criminal prosecutor does not have the institutional structure for following up 
on a monitor’s report. Several of the civil side regulators we spoke to told us that their 
organizations’ practice was to pass monitors’ reports onto their compliance/examinations 
departments, which would use the reports as blueprints for subsequent compliance 
examinations and audits. This means that individuals with expertise in at least auditing 
firms for compliance have regular opportunities to evaluate the firm’s or company’s 
progress past the end of the monitorship. Prosecutors’ offices have no such structure built 
into them. 
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That said, even within the regulatory context, there is a clear distinction between 
regulated entities and public companies, in terms of the kind of follow-up and oversight 
they can expect. Broker dealer firms and other regulated entities operate in a highly 
regulated environment and are required to be in contact with their regulators through a 
number of prescribed mechanisms. Nothing similar is required of public companies as a 
condition of listing – and most people would probably agree that nothing similar should 
be required.255 Given that public companies are not going to be closely regulated, 
monitorships may need to provide more explicitly for meaningful follow up, including 
perhaps longer terms for the monitorships themselves. Without such follow up, it is 
difficult to determine if a monitorship had any long-term impact short of evidence to the 
contrary from a similar compliance problem emerging at the same company. 
V. Toward More Meaningful Monitorships 
A. Monitorships in Theory and in Practice 
Earlier we placed monitorships on a continuum with four general categories—
Advisor, Auditor, Associate, and Autocrat—showing the range of possibilities from the 
least ambitious monitorship to the most ambitious.256 Typically, it appears that the 
government does not intend for the monitor to serve an Autocrat role, and with a few 
exceptions monitors have not taken on such a role. At the other extreme, an Advisor role 
may be appropriate where the government is comfortable that the wrongdoing is not 
widespread throughout the organization or being intentionally (or unintentionally) 
encouraged by the organization’s culture. Thus, an investigation may show that the 
wrongdoing was in fact due to just a few rogue employees, and an Advisor is necessary 
to help the corporation modify its compliance program and internal controls 
appropriately, as well as to ensure that appropriate resources are directed to the 
compliance program. In such a case, only technical adjustments to a company’s policies 
or procedures are deemed necessary. Perhaps such a case should not even be termed a 
“monitorship,” as independence may not be necessary.257  
The Auditor role is one step above the Advisor, and may be called for in 
substantially similar situations but where the government (1) has less confidence in the 
corporation’s ability or desire to make the needed changes; or (2) has been impressed by 
observed compliance program changes made by the corporation during the course of the 
investigation leading up to the settlement.258 In cases where the wrongdoing spreads 
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beyond a small number of individuals or there is evidence that organizational pressures or 
social norms were key contributing factors to the wrongdoing, then the Associate model 
may be needed. Under this model, the monitor investigates the root causes of wrongdoing 
– including all facets of the organizational culture – and collaborates with the corporation 
in a discursive, open-ended investigative project.  There appear to be some cases where 
this is occurring.259  
In the appropriate situations, the Associate model is the kind of monitorship that, 
in theory, 260 offers the greatest possibility of long-term, meaningful reform of corporate 
operations, as compared to the other models and the simple use of sanctions and other 
deterrence-based fines. Unlike financial sanctions, monitorships cannot be dismissed as 
just a “cost of doing business.” Instead, monitorships should work toward 
institutionalizing a self-reflective process within corporations that will address underlying 
causes of misconduct in the organization and implement, and then continually revise, an 
effective compliance program that is embedded within the organization’s culture. What 
makes them so promising in theory is that they are an institutionalized, structured 
mechanism for disrupting other, problematic institutions and structures. Disrupting 
existing ways of doing things also can help to reform a corporation, because sweeping 
away or rejecting the status quo can open up a space for reconsidering fundamental 
assumptions.261 Without the monitorships, this process of change is unlikely to occur in 
many corporations.262 For example, as one of our interviewees stated, 
 The greatest problem to effect change is the inevitable loss of 
momentum that occurs inside an entity once the crisis has passed. Just the 
everyday pressures that exist to do whatever business it is, to deal with 
whatever crisis there is, gets in the way of actually completing whatever it 
is people agree is the right thing to do. So having an independent 
consultant involved in the process puts a framework around it, just like 
program management does to cause ordinary change to take place. You 
need the discipline of someone outside the organization who's got a 
timeline, who's got to report to somebody. You have to have an end date. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
independent advisor the company hired to review their compliance program during the investigation stage 
was later hired as their monitor. See supra notes 200to 203 and accompanying text. A full consideration of 
the issues raised by this proposal is beyond the scope of this paper. 
259 The public statements of the CECO and monitor in the Computer Associates case seem to suggest that 
this was a successful monitorship based on what we term the Associate model. DPA Fulfilled, supra note 
234. However, virtually all top management at CA was replaced as part of the process. A much harder case 
is one in which top management stays.  
260 The following discussion of the potential advantages of monitorships in theory builds on an earlier 
discussion of reform undertakings (which focused on civil-side monitorships) as a form of New 
Governance regulation, by one of the authors of this paper. Ford, supra note 49.  
261 This is one of the key points made by Sabel and Simon, supra note 21, at 1073-82. See also Ford, supra 
note 49, at 805. 
262 See Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in 
Organizations, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 9, 20-21 (2005) (arguing that an external change agent is often 
needed to reverse corrupt organizational cultures); see also supra notes 230-235 and accompanying text 
(describing the potential benefits from simply a monitor’s presence in an organization). 
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When you have those things, then you've managed to meet all the 
milestones and get it done. 
Monitorships require the corporation to pay direct attention to the reasons for its 
past compliance failures and, with the prodding of a capable monitor, rehabilitate itself. 
This process should separate the reform effort from the enforcement action and allow a 
deep and demanding, but flexible and open-ended reform process to evolve as needed 
over a period of time.263 By separating enforcement and reform, corporations are 
expected to take a less adversarial stance and engage in less calculated cooperation,264 
and instead engage in a more open and discursive process that has a better chance of 
gaining company buy-in to the process.  In the background, the “big stick” of 
enforcement should help ensure the corporation is taking the process seriously.265  
In practice, however, monitorships that have the goal of reforming corporations 
are at risk of falling short. They rarely appear to be doing what compliance consultants 
would say is necessary to ensure the corporation’s compliance program is effective and 
will result in reforming a corporation’s culture over the long term. They also seem to be 
failing at generating the necessary self-reflective process. Even in cases where there is 
widespread wrongdoing within the organization, it seems the monitor is typically 
assuming the narrower Auditor role over the more in-depth Associate role. In this section, 
based on the evidence we have,266 we explain why this may be occurring. This is not to 
say that successful monitorships do not and cannot happen where the Associate model is 
required, but that those successes seem to be due to self-motivated individual efforts and 
not due to an effective system that produces consistent results. 
A key potential cause is that the incentives and motivations of the three actors 
involved in the monitorships (the company, the government, and the monitor) can come 
together in such a way that the monitorship process settles for a significantly lower level 
of operation and ambition than we would hope for. Although the parties’ interests may be 
aligned in the ways described above,267 they may not be aligned with the long-term best 
interests of shareholders or the public.268 Specifically, the corporation wants a 
                                                           
263 Ford, supra note 49, at 822. 
264 Hess and Ford, supra note 134, at 330 (using the term calculated cooperation to describe how the 
government granting corporations benefits for cooperation with the investigation creates incentives for 
“corporations to scapegoat certain employees to end the governmental inquiry without adequate 
examination of the organizational causes of the wrongful act”). 
265 Ford, supra note 49, at 823-24. 
266 The limitations of this study are identified above supra note 123 and accompanying text. As stated 
earlier, we hope that this report will be a springboard for additional study into the actual operation of 
monitorships, including more in-depth studies undertaken not only by academics housed in business and 
law schools, but also by other organizations with an interest and stake in corporate governance, ethics, and 
regulation. 
267 See Part IV.C.5. 
268 As one observer told us: 
You put the rabbit in the hat. I mean you started with the assumption that everybody 
wants the same thing and if that’s true then it makes your job very easy because what you 
need to do is to provide guidance and to document the cultural changes that have taken 
place in the organization, so it makes it very easy if that’s the case. But it’s not 
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monitorship that is just rigorous enough to allow the monitor to write a report that can 
satisfy the government; it does not want a monitorship that is broader in scope or more 
expensive than it has to be. The monitor wants to conduct an investigation that will 
enhance or at least not adversely affect her professional reputation and oversee a 
compliance program implementation that allows her to write a credible report for the 
government. Interestingly, if the use of monitorships continues to increase, some 
monitors seek to obtain future monitorship appointments, and the company has some 
meaningful say in the selection of the monitor,269 then monitors may actually come to 
operate in a more company-friendly manner. According to compliance consultants we 
interviewed, because the monitor has an eye to her next appointment, she may be careful 
about implementing too onerous a monitorship. Even if a monitor is not seeking 
additional monitorships, she may still conduct a company-friendly monitorship because 
of the natural tendency to view the corporation as a client, and the desire to “add value” 
for that client.270  
 The government also may not push the monitor and the company to go beyond a 
basic Advisor or Auditor model of monitorships. The prosecutor wants to close his file in 
a way that is reasonably calculated to ensure that the subject corporation has at least 
decent, industry-standard compliance processes in place (at least on paper), and then 
move on to the next case. The prosecutor does not want similar problems to recur at the 
same firm in short order, but separate fines and sanctions against individuals can go some 
distance here too. On the other hand, mindful of criticisms about monitors running amok, 
the prosecutor does not want to be unreasonable or to force the company, or more 
specifically its shareholders, to incur costs that are more burdensome than they have to 
be.  
The end results of these factors can be relatively conservative monitorships 
focused on technical compliance with policy and procedure requirements. There is little 
interest in a drawn-out, discursive process and no one seems to have an incentive to 
attempt a “deep dive” into issues of corporate culture. Even if the corporation itself may 
be motivated to do so, it may rationally choose not to deal with such issues with a 
corporate monitor that is not in an attorney-client privileged relationship with the 
corporation. Thus, despite any initial aspirations, the pressure on the monitorship 
structure is downward – toward the Advisor or Auditor model. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
necessarily true. A deferred prosecution agreement may be put in place because that’s 
the easiest way to bring a criminal case to a conclusion and the people who are running 
the company feel that they are getting off lightly. … it’s the culture that determines how 
people are going to behave in the organization, not any particular individual. Unless you 
bring about cultural reform you’re probably destined to repeat some form of misconduct 
at some point in the future as soon as the pressure is off. 
269 The three monitorships since the Morford Memo have all allowed the corporation to pick the monitor 
with the government retaining a veto power. 
270 Clearly, an effective compliance program can and should add value to a company, and even compliance 
consultants market themselves as claiming to add value to the company. There will be situations, however 
– especially here, in the enforcement context – where appropriate implementation of a compliance program 
requires some tradeoffs between at least short-term value and accountability. Monitors must ensure that 
they are considering not just company value and company concerns, but ensuring accountability to the 
government and the public more generally.  
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A second major cause of low-ambition monitorships—which also impacts the 
motivation of monitors discussed above—is the type of monitor that is being selected. As 
indicated earlier, the corporation wants to pick a monitor that has credibility with the 
government, and the government wants a monitor it can trust. The end result is the 
selection of a monitor that closely resembles a prosecutor’s profile (and commonly is an 
ex-prosecutor), which deeply affects the subsequent path the monitorship takes. The 
monitorship becomes a process designed by prosecutors, run by former prosecutors, and 
for ultimate consumption by prosecutors. As one monitor pointed out to us, the 
corporation only has “one shot at it,” and the stakes are high. It is not a time to take risks 
when a consensus is emerging about what constitutes an acceptable monitorship. The risk 
of a future problem emerging because underlying cultural issues have not been addressed 
feels remote in the middle of an acute incident, and people tend to discount future risks in 
favor of present needs in any event.271 In addition, without a system for tracking, 
aggregating, and sharing experiential and outcome data between companies or between 
US Attorney’s offices, the actors create the features of each monitorship in an 
environment of uncertainty and are likely to simply follow the lead of those who came 
before. In the end, with each subsequent monitorship, the conservative, technical 
compliance-oriented model is reproduced through a process similar to what 
organizational sociologists call mimetic isomorphism.272 
B. Reform Recommendations 
The shift toward the Advisor and Auditor end of the spectrum is not necessarily 
an intentional choice, but the result of choices along the way in a process that is 
influenced by the various motivations and incentives of the actors involved. Returning to 
our simplified four-stage monitorship model, we can identify decisions at each stage that 
affect the subsequent possibilities and generally push toward a less ambitious 
monitorship. These problems suggest various reforms to better structure a monitorship to 
meet the needs of the case at hand and to develop systems to help ensure monitorships 
improve over time. 
At the negotiation stage, the terms of the agreement are drafted in a way that 
leaves significant interpretation to the monitor. Although flexibility is one of the key 
virtues of monitorships, their effectiveness calls for more careful and context-specific 
thought upfront about the monitor’s exact role and the scope of monitorship. Second, 
parties are selecting monitors with a prosecutor’s mindset and skill set, as opposed to 
someone more closely identified as a compliance professional. Third, during the course 
of the monitorship and as a function of the two choices made above, monitorships tend to 
focus on technical compliance and easily measurable outcomes. Although we have been 
unable to review monitor reports in the for-profit corporation setting, our estimation 
                                                           
271 See David M. Messick and Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision 
Making, 37 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 9 (1996) (discussing decision-making biases including the problem of 
discounting future events and related biases that exacerbate that problem). 
272 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 151-52 (1983) (developing the idea 
of mimetic isomorphism, which involves organizations copying each other in the face of uncertainty due 
simply to the legitimacy established by the prior actor and not due to their fitness for the environment). 
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based on our interviews is that “corporate culture” is used more as a buzzword than as a 
meaningful construct. Finally, at the post-monitorship stage, efforts to capture learning 
from monitorships and apply it to other ones are virtually nonexistent. Instead, patterns 
are reproduced from one monitorship to the next based on precedent, rather than clear 
thought as to whether they are appropriate to the new situation. 
In the remainder of this article we provide recommendations for reform at each of 
these stages. We should note that our conclusions are limited in that we have had 
virtually no access to monitor reports and we have only had contact with a small sample 
of actors involved in monitorships.273 That said, even if more monitorships have been 
deeper and more consistent with compliance industry knowledge than we surmised, the 
systematic problems we identify are real in some number of cases and could easily 
become the norm if they are not monitored and managed appropriately. In addition, these 
reforms will not lessen the effectiveness of monitorship models that have been effective, 
but will only work to strengthen them and improve the chances for success for all 
monitorships. 
1. Crafting Monitorships for the Case at Hand  
Once the government decides to agree to a monitorship, it needs to clearly 
articulate the reasons that it came to that conclusion. In addition, and flowing from that 
original rationale for the monitorship, the agreement should be more specific on what role 
the monitor is expected to adopt. The challenge in many situations, however, is 
determining the corporation’s reform needs before the monitor has started her work. 
Currently, the government relies on its own investigation, which in turn relies 
heavily on the company’s internal investigation. Many corporations conduct proactive 
internal reviews when internal wrongdoing comes to light. An important policy reason 
for granting corporations “credit for cooperation” is that it allows the government to 
essentially outsource its investigations. As one interviewee stated, “[t]he good thing 
about it is that it leverages the government’s resources. I mean, with a handful of 
prosecutors you can be running many huge investigations of big companies, which if you 
had to staff it with your own people you’d never be able to do.”274 These investigations 
can be a valuable source of information. For example, they may demonstrate that a 
corporation’s compliance program is clearly inadequate.275 However, internal 
investigations are not equivalent to a monitor’s investigation and their context must be 
taken into account. For our purposes, a central concern is that internal investigators are 
motivated to identify individual “bad apples,” and away from identifying deep problems 
of corporate culture.276 Thus, the government should not automatically assume, based on 
                                                           
273 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
274 Of course this outsourcing has been controversial, especially with respect to the perception that the 
government routinely requires corporations to waive attorney-client privilege in order to be considered 
cooperating – a concern that the revised charging guidelines for corporations addresses. See supra note 88. 
275 See, e.g., Faro Technologies, supra note 164, whose compliance program did not even discuss the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
276 Ford, supra note 49, at 792-96; see also Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, supra note 114, at 648 
(describing a problem he calls Reverse Whistle Blowing, which “occurs when an organization, typically 
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an internal investigation, that there is no need for a more ambitious, Associate-style 
monitorship.  
One possible solution is to follow the lead of the US Attorney in the Mellon Bank 
case, who hired compliance consultants to investigate the company before she agreed to a 
DPA.277 Although there are of course significant limits on the ability of such consultants 
to determine the state of compliance at the time of the offense (which typically includes 
acts that have occurred months or years ago), the consultants can investigate the current 
state of compliance to make a recommendation as to whether they believe the company is 
at risk of engaging in similar activity in the future. This recommendation can then be 
used by the parties as they negotiate the terms of the settlement, including the role of the 
monitor. 
Next, to ensure the monitor conducts an appropriate investigation and follows the 
desired monitorship model, the basic structure of a work plan should be incorporated into 
the settlement agreement. This ensures that, where a complete and thorough investigation 
of the company’s ethics and compliance program and organizational culture is called for, 
this is actually what the monitor does. It also should help weed out potential monitors 
who do not have skills and experience to conduct this type of investigation. In addition, it 
may be useful to have some form of the final work plan made available to the public (in a 
redacted form if necessary to protect any legitimate privacy concerns of the corporation) 
for purposes of accountability and information sharing for future monitorships. This more 
direct guidance upfront still allows the monitorship to develop and evolve in a manner 
that meets the needs of the situation, but (along with other necessary reforms) helps 
ensure that the monitor does not move to a lower ambition monitorship, such as an 
Advisor or Auditor role, where the needs of the situation do not justify that move. 
2. Selecting the Monitor: Competency versus Credibility 
One thing we heard from several monitors is that, ultimately, the success of the 
monitorship comes down to the personal qualities of the monitor chosen. Several 
monitors emphasized the importance of professional judgment. At its starkest, we heard 
that it may be “impossible for monitorships to be institutionalized” because “[t]he kind of 
self-restraint, the kind of self-critical analysis, the kind of self-discipline that you need to 
be a monitor is very, very, very unusual and there’s nothing that really prepares you for 
it.” This observer told us about the “intellectual and emotional discipline” required to do 
the job:  
You got to be prepared to pull the plug and quit, or you’ve got to 
be prepared to turn on the people that you’ve come to like and feel are 
supportive, or you’ve got to be prepared to defend people that you don’t 
like depending on the circumstances that you find yourself in. And you’ve 
got to do it in a way where every time you make a judgment, every time 
you express yourself you can back up your conclusions with overwhelming 
                                                                                                                                                                             
through the acts of senior management, identifies culpable employees and offers evidence against them in a 
trade with prosecutors for corporate leniency or possible amnesty.”)  
277 See supra  notes 162-163 and accompanying text. 
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evidence that you’re correct and you can’t afford to make a mistake, it’s a 
zero defect kind of a role. 
Accepting the difficulties of the job and the inherent tensions in it, there are still 
steps that can be taken to increase the possibility of an effective monitorship. Of primary 
importance is finding the monitor with the right skills for the monitorship at hand. The 
Morford Memo is correct in stating that the corporation should maintain responsibility for 
designing its compliance and ethics program because only corporate managers, and not 
the monitor, have duties to shareholders.278 The point is not to have monitors take over 
corporations and their compliance programs, because there can be more than one way to 
implement a compliance program and each can be equally correct and effective. It should 
be the corporation’s choice on which approach to take, as long as its choice is reasonable 
and it can convince the monitor of the likely effectiveness of the proposed approach.  
To determine this effectiveness, the monitor must have sufficient experience with 
the workings of ethics and compliance programs in practice. This does not mean simply 
technical compliance with legal requirements, but an understanding of how matters that 
affect a corporation’s culture, such as rewards systems, impact the effectiveness of a 
compliance program that looks complete on paper. These issues go to the heart of the 
monitor’s effectiveness. Overall, as one compliance consultant told us, there is a reason 
why the compliance profession has developed, and it is that lawyers focused on technical 
compliance were not getting the job done.279 Because the monitor’s primary duty is to 
ensure the corporation has an effective compliance program, then those with the 
experience and skills to serve as a chief ethics and compliance officer should be the first 
people to be considered for the position.  
The current dominant use of ex-prosecutors and similar attorneys as monitors was 
not a conscious choice resulting from a consensus that corporate compliance problems 
will be addressed most effectively by using such monitors. The terms of the monitorship 
agreements we reviewed do not specify this preference, and, indeed, the Morford Memo 
explicitly states that non-lawyers can do this work.280 To address the ossification around 
this model, the government must be involved in the selection process and implement 
policies on the skills and experience a monitor should have, related to the growing body 
of knowledge from compliance professionals. 
In selecting the monitor, there also must be some balance between the 
government selecting the monitor and the corporation selecting the monitor with the 
government only retaining a veto power. If the corporation has too much control over the 
                                                           
278 Morford Memo, supra note 152, Principle 3, which states: “A monitor is not responsible to the 
corporation's shareholders. Therefore, from a corporate governance standpoint, responsibility for 
designing an ethics and compliance program that will prevent misconduct should remain with the 
corporation, subject to the monitor's input, evaluation and recommendations.” 
279 We are not saying that monitors whose primary experience is having been a prosecutor or white collar 
defense attorney cannot get the job done (and there seems to be evidence that they can). What we are 
saying is that the prosecutorial model of lawyering seems to be under-equipped to do this job in many 
cases, especially those we have deemed appropriate for an Associate model of monitorship (See supra note 
134 and accompanying text), and should not on its own be considered either a necessary or a sufficient 
requirement for selection as a monitor.  
280 Morford Memo, supra note 152. 
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process, then it may attempt to select monitors that are company-friendly. In addition, 
there is the potential for the monitor to begin to view the company as her client, 
especially if the monitor underwent an interview in which she had to convince the 
corporation to hire her. If the government has too much control, then it may select 
monitors through a process that raises legitimacy concerns (i.e., selected based on 
personal connections rather than merit) or that will not work well with the company, and 
as stated earlier, corporate buy-in and trust of the monitor are key factors for a successful 
monitorship. Monitors should be selected through a process in which the parties select a 
mutually acceptable monitor. In addition, during the post-monitorship review (we suggest 
reforms in this area below), the government should collect data on the performance of the 
monitors and ensure that information is available to those government officials involved 
in the selection process. 
Government involvement in the selection process—and greater contact with the 
monitor throughout the monitorship—also should help ensure monitor accountability and 
independence. The Morford Memo and most (but not all) DPAs place great importance 
on structural independence (meaning a monitor who has no prior business relationship 
with a firm, and who is precluded from taking one for a period of years after the 
monitorship). This does not, however, ensure independence of mind. At a subconscious 
level if not a conscious one, the fact that the company is paying the monitor may 
motivate the monitor to try to convince the company that he or she is “adding value,” in 
much the same way that in the rest of their practice these same attorneys want their 
clients to see the value of the services they provide. Especially where the monitor is 
working on a close and daily basis at the company, with little contact with the 
government, the (conscious or subconscious) desire to have positive interpersonal 
interactions with key players can become significant. Thus, structural independence must 
be supplemented with other aspects of the monitor process, such as greater contact and 
involvement with the government during the process. The government should be in 
regular contact with the monitor and provide written feedback with its assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the monitor’s investigations and reports.281  
3. Compliance for the Long Term 
The goal of a monitorship is to ensure that the corporation implements an 
effective ethics and compliance program. Although monitorships are typically 24 to 36 
months in duration, they are expected to have an impact that lasts significantly longer. 
The first step in accomplishing this is designing a monitorship that can assist the 
corporation in uncovering root causes of misconduct, identifying persistent organizational 
culture hurdles standing in the way of adopting an effective ethics and compliance 
program, and assist in identifying and implementing effective measures in light of these 
factors.282  
                                                           
281 See Christine Parker, Regulator-Required Corporate Compliance Program Audits, 25 LAW & POL’Y 
221, 237 (2003) (making similar recommendations in the context of auditor reports for enforceable 
undertakings in Australia). 
282 On root cause analysis, see William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule 
Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne De Búrca et al., 2006). 
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To ensure lasting change, the next step must be to entrench the changes made 
during the monitorship into the operations and structure of the corporation. Susan Sturm 
has described, in a different context, how the “architecture” of an organization needs to 
be reconfigured to prevent backsliding at the end of an acute intervention like a 
monitorship.283 Con Ed’s  monitorship appears to be an example of exactly that 
problem.284 In the context of forcing compliance reform on a corporation, a leading 
example is the use of Corporate Integrity Agreements that require certain structural 
changes.285 DPAs often require similar changes, such as the appointment of a Chief 
Ethics and Compliance Officer or the selection of independent directors to serve on the 
board committee with supervision duties over the compliance program.286   
Thus, to help ensure that changes remain once the pressure is off,287 settlement 
agreements where the Associate monitorship model is required should likely include the 
following requirements. First, if the position does not already exist, the corporation 
should appoint a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer and make that person part of the 
company’s high-level management. Second, the CECO should be an agent of the board 
of directors, at least as far as incentive compensation and termination decisions are 
concerned.288 Third, the corporation’s board should be required to adopt a compliance 
committee, and the CECO should have reporting responsibilities to that committee.289 
During the course of the monitorship, the monitor should ensure that the CECO and 
compliance committee are performing their duties competently. In addition, and as 
discussed further below, information should be systematically collected on when and why 
such requirements are used, and this information should be combined with data collected 
by the monitor on how well these structural changes have worked. 
4. Post-Monitorship: Institutionalize Learning  
One of the regulators we spoke with indicated that, with respect to the degree of 
independence they required of the monitor, their organization had developed an informal 
policy to help ensure that burdensome independence requirements were not imposed 
where they were not necessary. This policy was apparently based, at least in part, on a 
review of its past monitorships. However, this same regulator did not see a reason to 
analyze the content of the monitors’ recommendations in the same overarching manner to 
                                                           
283 See Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Interdisciplinary Insights on Pursuing Institutional 
Citizenship, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 409 (2006). 
284 See supra notes 62-63, and accompanying text (describing the Con Ed story). 
285 See supra note 51-52 and accompanying text (describing the use of corporate integrity agreements). 
286 See Aurora Foods, supra note 183, at 4 (requiring both the appointment of a compliance officer and two 
independent directors to serve on the audit committee); Baker Hughes, supra note 206, at paragraph 7.b.iii 
(requiring the assignment of a corporate official to be in charge of the compliance program and requiring 
that person to report directly to the board’s Audit/Ethic Committee). 
287 See quote supra note 268. 
288 See supra notes 107-112 accompanying text (describing arguments for making the CECO an agent of 
the board of directors). 
289 See also Hess, supra note 91, at 1809 (arguing in favor of a compliance committee with authority over 
the CECO). 
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see, for example, if insights could be generated for handling the most common 
compliance failures, or if best practices in resolving common problems were starting to 
emerge. Many of our interviewees had not contemplated that much valuable information 
would come from this kind of exercise, especially considering the amount of work 
involved. 
We believe that the absence of systematic methods for capturing the lessons of 
past monitorships is a major failing. As indicated above, the government must play some 
role in this process. 290  Although monitors seek to have this information, they are 
reluctant to provide it to others either because they view it as proprietary information or 
they appropriately do not want to disclose confidential information about the corporation.  
There are several reasons why there is a need to develop mechanisms to capture 
the learning from monitorships.291 First, costs are reduced by new monitors not having to 
reinvent the wheel for their monitorship. Monitors reported having no models to rely 
upon for developing a work plan or even drafting their report, and corporations are 
therefore required to pay the bill for their learning on the job. Second, to improve the 
effectiveness of monitorships, an effort must be made to capture best practices and 
review their evolution over time due to increased experience. Third, capturing these 
lessons also allows the government (including US Attorneys without any experience with 
monitorships) to become more knowledgeable and therefore more productive participants 
in the monitorships along the lines suggested above, including negotiating the settlement 
agreements, selecting monitors based on their skills and experience, and reviewing the 
monitor’s work during the monitorship. This allows the four stages of a monitorship we 
identified above to function as a cycle, where the lessons from past monitorships feed 
into the next round of monitorships. 
 The lessons the government should attempt to capture include not just best 
practices on the monitorship process, but also indicators on the final performance of 
monitorships over time. This is vital information for determining if monitorships are even 
working as a policy alternative. Overall, without an effort to analyze the experiences of 
monitorships and attempting to distill the lessons to be learned, then certain ineffective 
practices may become the standard without appropriate thought and evaluation.  
VI. Conclusion 
Like others, we are concerned with the development of corporate monitorships. 
Our concerns, however, have less to do with fears of unaccountable monitors running 
roughshod over corporations and more to do with monitors not conducting deep dives 
into the corporation’s culture. As stated by the Ethics Resource Center—a leading 
                                                           
290 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
291 More generally, a number of New Governance scholars have emphasized the need for a “central data 
clearinghouse” or other similar structure to permit collective learning and disseminate best practices. See, 
e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 267, 345-56 (1998) (calling for agencies to engage in benchmarking, or “comparative evaluations” of 
one another, in order to ultimately achieve best practices); Susan P. Sturm, supra note 283, at 327-31 
(describing institutional intermediaries). See also MALCOLM SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: 
CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 167-68 (2000) (expressing a 
desire for agencies to “organize the lessons they learn and to make the accumulated knowledge readily 
available”). 
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nonprofit conducting research on organizational ethics—“Ethical culture is the single 
biggest factor determining the amount of misconduct in [an] organization.”292 Likewise, 
to obtain the benefits of a mitigated sentence under the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines a corporation must “promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical 
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”293 In some cases, monitors are 
dealing with these issues to at least some degree, but in others they are not. Not delving 
into these issues may be the right decision in certain limited situations. In practice, 
however, this determination has less to do with a well-thought-out strategy to match the 
monitorship to the case at hand, and more to do with flaws in the monitorship process. In 
cases where wrongdoing is widespread within the organization and social pressures 
toward corruption are great, the monitor must investigate a corporation’s culture and 
force the corporation to address these issues if monitorships are expected to have a 
reliable impact on corporate behavior over the long term. We are not saying that 
technical, compliance-based monitorships are never useful. Having in place appropriate 
processes and procedures is important to corporate compliance and is the foundation of 
an ethical corporate culture. Thus, all monitors serve an important function in making 
sure that firms are structurally equipped to prevent and detect internal wrongdoing. What 
we advocate, though, is a monitorship process that incorporates some of the learning that 
has emerged from compliance professionals about the importance of organizational 
culture. The reforms suggested here—including rethinking who is qualified to serve as a 
monitor and capturing the lessons from experience—are simple steps toward creating 
more ambitious and more consistently successful monitorships.  
                                                           
292 Ethics Res. Ctr., 5ational Business Ethics Survey: An Inside View of Private Sector Ethics 26 (2007). 
293 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (2004). 
